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HOME OF THE FEARFUL: THE USE OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION TO DEPORT SUSPECTED TERRORISTS
Dave Martella*
INTRODUCTION
The dismantling of the Iron Curtain and the resignation of the Soviet
Union as the wellspring of communism is forcing the United States to
reevaluate its arsenal of democracy. One weapon in its inventory which
is quickly falling into obsolescence is the ideological exclusion and de-
portation of alien persons.' Recently, Congress began chipping away at
the fortifications of the Cold War by repealing part of a 1952 law
which denied visas on the basis of the political beliefs or associations of
aliens wishing to visit the United States.2 The courts also now demand
a greater showing by the government that an alien poses a threat to
national security' before that alien can be excluded or deported.
* J.D. Candidate 1993, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. See David Cole, The 1952 McCarren-Walter Act: Is it Irrelevant in Today's
World?, NAT'L L.J., May 29, 1989, at 22 (hereinafter The 1952 McCarren-Walter
Act) (discussing proposed amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952). The term "alien" itself may be an anachronism. Professor Schuck finds that the
term "alien" may reflect American society's hostile perception of foreign persons as
strangers. Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 CoLu?,i. L.
REV. 1, 1 (1984). In continuing the fiction, the term "alien" is intended to mean for-
eign persons wishing to enter the country, or resident foreign persons who are not
United States citizens.
2. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 101-246, 104 Stat. 15 (1990).
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 still permits the ideological exclusion of
aliens seeking permanent residency in the United States. Steven A. Holmes, Legisla-
tion Eases Limits on Aliens, N.Y. Tihm, Feb. 2, 1990, at A6. The Act also allows the
government to exclude any alien suspected of engaging in terrorist activity or whose
presence in the United States would adversely affect United States foreign policy. Pub.
L. No. 101-649, § 601(a)(3)(B)-(C), 104 Stat. 4978, 5069-72 (amending 8 U.S.C. §
1182 (1988)).
3. SENATE CONMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PROCEDURES
ACT, S. REP. No. 823, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980). "National security" is defined as
matters that relate to the national defense and foreign relations of the United States.
Id.
4. See, e.g., Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that provi-
sions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 are unconstitutional because
they exclude aliens on the basis of their political affiliations); Abourezk v. Reagan, 785
F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aftid, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (per curiam) (holding that an
alien may not be excluded for reasons merely arising from his or her affiliation with an
organization).
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Although traditional tools of ideological exclusion are fading with
the dissolution of the communist threat, the United States is procuring
updated methods of excluding political undesirables.5 At the forefront
of this campaign is the immigration restriction for terrorism. Current
laws and proposed legislation continue to grant the executive branch
broad discretionary powers to prevent suspected terrorists from pene-
trating United States borders.7 Critics warn that these laws, under the
guise of preserving national security, are often used against those who
merely dissent from United States foreign policy."
The most recent fight against terrorism occurred in the summer of
1991 when the Bush Administration introduced legislation to provide
deportation hearings for suspected terrorists in which neither the de-
fendant-alien nor the public would be allowed to view the government's
evidence. 9 The Administration argued that in camera, ex parte proce-
dures are necessary to protect classified information used in ferreting
out terrorists within the United States.10 Although congressional lead-
ers withdrew these removal provisions to ease passage of the Adminis-
tration's crime package, the legislation represents the difficulty in com-
batting terrorism without encroaching upon individual freedoms. 1
Part I of this Note examines domestic terrorist activities and the re-
cent proposal to use in camera, ex parte hearings to deport resident
5. See infra text accompanying notes 76-88 (examining the history of the United
States legislation involving the exclusion of aliens based on ideological considerations).
6. See The 1952 McCarren-Walter Act, supra note 1, at 22 (arguing that use of
"terrorist activity" and "foreign policy" as standards of immigration exclusion is sub-
ject to political manipulation by the administration in power). Cole warns, in his con-
clusion, that although Congress updates immigration law to confront modern-day con-
cerns, definitions of terms such as "terrorism" must be sufficiently narrow to avoid a
broad and arbitrary interpretation that serves as a means of ideological exclusion. Id.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 76-88 (discussing that, in the late 1970s,
Congress enacted legislation to expand the exclusion and deportation of suspected
terrorists).
8. David Cole, Secret Tribunal, THE NATION, May 6, 1991, at 581 (criticizing the
recent Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) investigations of Palestinian-born resident aliens accused of affiliating
with terrorist organizations).
9. S. 635, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. Title VII, 137 CONG. REC. S3233 (daily ed. Mar.
13, 1991).
10. See infra note 46 (examining findings of the administration that many aliens,
within the United States, are conducting terrorist operations).
11. See Helen Dewar, Administration Drops Plan for Secret Trials of Aliens,
WASH. POST, June 21, 1991, at A4 (quoting Assistant Attorney General Lee Rawls
who confirmed that the deportation provisions caused difficulties in the effort to pass
other high priority crime provisions). Shortly after Republican leaders withdrew the
deportation procedures, Senator Alan Simpson proposed amending the Democratic ver-
sion of the Crime Bill with a version of the Terrorist Alien Removal Act similar to the
original deportation measures. 137 CONG. REc. S9384 (daily ed. July 9, 1991) (pro-
posed amendment to S. 1241). Senator Simpson, however, did not pursue the matter.
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aliens suspected of engaging in terrorist activity."2 Part II then argues
that recent counterterrorism immigration policies are fast becoming the
tools of ideological exclusion for the United States in the new world
order.13 Part III then examines whether the in camera, ex parte depor-
tation procedures can be reconciled with the due process rights of resi-
dent aliens. 4 Finally, Part IV offers suggestions for future legislative
efforts to protect America from politically motivated violence."5
I. THE DOMESTIC CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM
A. THE TERRORIST THREAT IN AMERICA
Most Americans' fear of terrorism stems from the violent and fre-
quent attacks on those who venture beyond America's borders.'" Al-
most one in four international terrorist incidents threatens American
lives. 17 Several highly publicized attacks leave vivid images of the de-
structive ability of a few daring individuals including the 1983 destruc-
tion of the Marine barracks in Beirut which claimed 241 American
lives, "'8 the 1985 bombing of a West Berlin nightclub,' the 1985 hi-
jacking of the Achille Lauro cruise ship resulting in the murder of a
handicapped American tourist,20 and the 1988 bombing of Pan Am
12. See infra text accompanying notes 16-39 (assessing the magnitude of the ter-
rorist threat within the United States).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 60-147 (reviewing the historical underpin-
nings of ideological exclusion policies).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 149-241 (examining the due process rights
of resident aliens, and their rights to view classified information in a deportation
hearing).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 242-65 (proposing ways to maintain an ef-
fective domestic counterterrorism program while limiting the occurrence of ideological
deportations).
16. Cf. WAYMAN C. MULLINS, TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
30-33 (1988) [hereinafter MULLINS] (examining terrorism's purpose of maximizing the
use of fear to intimidate its intended audiences); WILUAM R. FARRELL, THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: IN SEARCH OF AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY iX
(1982) [hereinafter FARRELL] (discussing how the public perceives and responds to
terrorist attacks).
17. William S. Sessions, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigations, Address to the
National Strategy Forum, Chicago, Illinois (Feb. 5, 1990), reprinted in The FBI's Mis-
sion in Countering Terrorism, 13 TERRORISM 1, 2 (1990) [hereinafter The FBI'S Mis-
sion]. Of the 856 international terrorist incidents which occurred in 1988, 185 were
directed at United States citizens. Id. In 1989, 165 of the 659 recorded terrorist attacks
involved United States citizens. Id.
18. Philip Taubman, Pentagon's Inquiry Blames Major Marine Commanders and
Faulty Policy in Beirut, N.Y. TIDIES, Dec. 29, 1983, at Al.
19. 2 Killed, 155 Hurt in Bomb Explosion at Club in Berlin, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6,
1986, at Al.
20. E.J. Dionne Jr., Hostage's Death: 'A Shot to Forehead', N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,
1985, at Al.
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flight 103 which killed 189 Americans returning from Europe for the
winter holidays.2'
The effect of terrorist attacks on their intended audience is consid-
ered more dangerous than the immediate physical loss.2 2 The threat of
terrorism greatly influences the willingness of Americans to travel
abroad as business persons, diplomats, and tourists. 23 The public's per-
ception of the government's ability to effectively respond to terrorism
may even determine the political survivability of a particular
administration.24
Not surprisingly, America took seriously Saddam Hussein's vow dur-
ing the Persian Gulf War to unleash his terrorist forces against the
United States.25 From the United States Capitol to highly publicized
sporting events, and at every major airport across the country, the
United States was on full security alert.2" More recently, the Middle
East Peace Conference of 1991, hosted by the United States and the
former Soviet Union, precipitated a new wave of terrorist violence by
radical factions.27 The United States, however, has yet to suffer a do-
21. Jonathan C. Randal, Service Mourns Flight 103 Victims, WASH. POST, Jan. 5,
1989, at A20. A total of 270 people died in the explosion of a Pan Am jetliner. Id.
22. See MULLINS, supra note 16, at 33-36 (explaining that an element common to
all definitions of terrorism is the motivation to affect the behavior of an audience larger
than the terrorist's immediate victims).
23. See Agis Salpukas, Air Travelers On Business Trickle Back, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 1991, at DI (discussing the fear of United States citizens to travel abroad during
the Persian Gulf War); Cindy Skrzycki & Martha M. Hamilton, Fear of Terrorism
Causing Americas to Trim Travel, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1991, at Al.
24. See Yonah Alexander, Remarks at the Symposium on the Legal Aspects of
Terrorism, Washington, D.C., (Nov. 7, 1988), in Legal Aspects of Terrorism, 12 TER-
RORISM 297, 297 (1989) (alleging that President Carter's inability to resolve the Iran
hostage crises through either diplomatic or military means substantially contributed to
his defeat in the 1980 presidential election).
25. See Sharon LaFraniere & George Lardner, U.S. Set to Photograph, Finger-
print All New Iraqi and Kuwaiti Visitors, WASH. POST, Jan. I1, 1991, at A23; James
Barron, Confrontation in the Gulf. Security; U.S. Taking Steps to Curb Terrorism,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1991, at A15 (reporting on domestic efforts to guard against Iraqi
led terrorist attacks). See also Brian Duffy & Louise Lief, Saddam Hussein's Unholi-
est Allies, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 28, 1991, at 42, 42 (reporting on terrorists
operating under Saddam Hussein's control, including Abul Abbas, who orchestrated
the Achille Lauro hijacking, and Abu Nidal, who heads one of the most dangerous
terrorist organizations in the world today).
26. See Will America Be Held Hostage, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 28,
1991, at 10 (reporting on efforts to tighten security at important government, recrea-
tion, and infrastructure locations). See also Patricia A. Gilmartin & James T. McK-
enna, U.S. Warns of Iraqi-led Terrorism As Carriers, Airports Tighten Security, Avi-
ATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 21, 1991, at 64 (describing airport security measures
taken during the Persian Gulf War).
27. See Louise Lief, Tehran Hosts a Predator's Ball, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Nov. 4, 1991, at 38 (reporting on a conference of Palestinian radicals and Islamic
fundamentalists who met in Iran to discuss their opposition to the Middle East peace
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mestic terrorist attack prompted by the Persian Gulf War or the Peace
Conference.2" In fact, although hundreds of terrorist incidents have oc-
curred in the United States since the late 1970s, only a few have in-
volved international groups.29
Domestic acts of terrorism emanate from two sources: domestic orga-
nizations and international groups operating within the United States. 30
Domestic terrorist groups function without any foreign guidance or mo-
tivation31 and focus primarily on domestic issues such as race, religion,
federal taxation, and the environment.3 2 International groups within
talks). The International Conference in Support of the Islamic Revolution attracted a
bevy of Middle East radicals and leaders of various terrorist organizations. Id. Conven-
ing under a banner which read "Israel Must be Destroyed," the Islamic Conference
resolved that armed struggle remains the only means of liberating Palestine. Id. at 39.
One day prior to the start of the Middle East Peace Conference of 1991 (the "Peace
Conference"), terrorists attacked a civilian bus in the Israeli occupied West Bank, kill-
ing a Jewish woman and the bus driver. Clyde Haberman, At Israel Funeral. Mood is
Defiant, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 30, 1991, at A12. The Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine claimed responsibility for the attack. Id. The opening days of the Conference
also brought several military exchanges in South Lebanon between Muslim fundamen-
talist guerillas and Israeli troops. Id.
Arab extremists also launched a rocket attack against the United States embassy in
East Beirut and vowed to attack other American targets. Rocket Hits Embassy in
Lebanon, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1991, at A12. Middle East radicals also claimed re-
sponsibility for two explosions in Ankara, Turkey which killed an American serviceman
and seriously wounded an Egyptian diplomat. William Touhy, 2 Jewish Settlers Killed
in West Bank, WASH. PosT, Oct. 29, 1991, at A16, A18.
28. Cf. Agis Salpukas, Air Travelers On Business Trickle Back, N.Y. Tmiias Feb.
19, 1991, at DI. (discussing the reduced fears of American business travelers in the
wake of the Persian Gulf War). The author found no reports of domestic terrorist
attacks against the United States. Id.
29. See Robert Ricks, Deputy Assistant Director, FBI, Address at the conference
on "Terrorism: An Evaluation of the Reagan Years and an Agenda for the Next Ad-
ministration," Wash., D.C., reprinted in Future Domestic and International Terror-
isn: The FBI Perspective, 11 TERRORIShi 538, 538-39 (1988) [hereinafter Future Do-
mestic and International Terrorism] (stating that since 1983, the FBI has not recorded
a single act of terrorism in the United States perpetrated by an international group).
Terrorism in the United States has declined dramatically since the late 1970s. In 1978,
the FBI recorded 112 terrorist incidents in the United States. Id. By 1989, that number
decreased to four incidents. The FBIs Mission, supra note 17, at 1.
30. Id. at 3; see MULLINS, supra note 16, at 36-39 (defining the different types of
terrorism). Mullins suggests four different categories of terrorism: transnational terror-
ism, international terrorism, domestic terrorism, and state terrorism. Id. Transnational
terrorism is carried out by non-state supported actors. Id. at 36. International terror-
ism, or state-sponsored terrorism, involves groups whose control is absorbed by a sover-
eign state. Id. at 37-38. Domestic terrorists conduct virtually all of their operations
within a country against a single government. Id. at 38. Finally, state terrorism in-
volves acts conducted by a government against its own citizens. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id. (discussing the difference between domestic terrorist organizations and
international terrorist groups operating within the United States). Domestic terrorist
groups include the Aryan Nation and The Order, which advocate white supremacy,
and the Sheriff's Posse Comitatus and the Arizona Patriots, which regard federal and
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the United States receive foreign assistance and direction. This guid-
ance comes from large terrorist networks outside the United States, in-
cluding the Baader-Meinhoff Gang based in Germany, and the Italian-
based Red Brigades."3 According to the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tions (FBI), nearly every major Middle East terrorist group operates a
surrogate organization within the United States.34 Several governments
also support, control, and direct international terrorism.3 5 Not since
1983, however, has an international group executed a successful terror-
state laws as unconstitutional. Id. The May 19th Communist Organization is a domes-
tic Marxist-Leninist organization which advocates the violent overthrow of the United
States. FBI Oversight and Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 1990: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 316, 322 (1989) (synopsis of terrorist incidents re-
corded by the FBI in 1988).
Other quasi-domestic groups include the Reunion Flotilla, which calls for free emi-
gration to and from Cuba, and the Armed Forces of the National Liberation, which
advocates the independence of Puerto Rico. Id. at 317, 320. Puerto Rican separatists
are also the most active perpetrators of terrorism, along with radical environmentalists
advocating sabotage of domestic energy production facilities. Edward V. Badolato, Ter-
rorism and the U.S. Energy Infrastructure, 13 TERRORISM 159, 159-60 (1990).
33. The FBI's Mission, supra note 17, at 3.
34. Future Domestic and International Terrorism, supra note 29, at 539. The FBI
alleges that the Abu Nidal terrorist group may have "sleeper" agents established in the
Palestinian populations of Los Angeles, Detroit, and Chicago. Brian Duffy & Louise
Lief, Saddam Hussein's Unholiest Allies, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 28, 1991,
at 42, 42. Sleeper agents infiltrate a country and live peacefully for years within a
community. Id. When called upon, however, they will execute terrorist acts against
that same community. Id.
35. See Neil C. Livingston & Terrell E. Arnold, The Rise of State Sponsored Ter-
rorism, in FIGHTING BACK: WINNING THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM 11-24 (1984)
[hereinafter Livingston & Arnold] (discussing the growth of state-sponsored terrorism
by the agents of the former Soviet Union and several third-world nations). Livingston
and Arnold assert that during the 1970s the former Soviet Union sponsored terrorism
to disrupt Western nations. Id. at 13. In the 1980s, countries such as Iran, Libya, and
Syria began managing their own agendas for terrorism. Id. at 14-20. The Iranian gov-
ernment, under the leadership of the Ayatollah Khomeini, for example, not only con-
doned the 1979 seizure of the American embassy in Tehran, but also fed the financial
and military needs of the radical Islamic Jihad. Id. at 14-15. The Iranian government
has also been linked to the 1983 bombings of the Marine barracks in Beirut and the
United States Embassy in Kuwait. Id. at 15.
Syria has confined its devices of terrorism to interests exclusively in the Middle East.
Id. at 20. Cultivating ties with Iranian sponsored terrorist groups, Damascus maintains
terrorist training camps in the Syrian controlled parts of Lebanon. Id. at 19.
Libya utilizes foreign diplomatic missions and official emissaries to transport weap-
ons and provide support for international terrorists. Id. at 18. Accordingly, Muammar
Qaddafi may have planned to use Libyan diplomats to assassinate dissidents in Western
Europe. Id. In 1984, FBI agents arrested two Libyan intelligence officers posing as
students as they attempted to buy weapons in Philadelphia. Future Domestic and In-
ternational Terrorism, supra note 29, at 539. Libya is also suspected of sponsoring the
bombing of Pan Am flight 103 which killed 270 people, including 189 Americans. Ger-
ald F. Seib, Amid Peace Talks, Specter of Terrorism Will Return to Haunt President
Bush, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1991, at All.
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ist strike on United States territory."' The FBI has intercepted several
terrorist attacks and assassination attempts that could have resulted in
the deaths of hundreds of Americans.3 7 Although new rounds of vio-
lence surrounding the Middle East Peace Conference of 1991 again put
the United States on alert,38 civil rights groups warn that domestic
counterterrorism efforts threaten the rights of resident aliens.3
B. THE ABORTED TERRORIST ALIEN REMOVAL ACT
Recent criticism has focused upon legislation introduced in the
spring of 1991, which called for the in camera, ex parte use of classi-
fied evidence to deport resident aliens suspected of supporting terrorist
36. Future Domestic and International Terrorism, supra note 29, at 539.
37. Id. In 1983, several Iranian students conspired to chain the doors of a Seattle
theater and then ignite fire bombs inside. Id. The FBI and local police, however, suc-
cessfully thwarted the plan. Id. That same year, a group protesting the United States
invasion of Grenada and the presence of Marines in Beirut, Lebanon detonated a bomb
inside the Capitol building. Robert Pear, Bomb Explodes in Senate Wing of Capitol:
No Injuries Reported, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 18, 1983, at Al, col. 3.
In 1986, the FBI and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police prevented Sikh terrorists
from destroying a 747 airplane scheduled to depart from John F. Kennedy Interna-
tional Airport. Future Domestic and International Terrorism, supra note 29, at 539. In
1987, a Vermont federal district court convicted three members of the Syrian Social
Nationalist Party for attempting to transport explosives across the Canadian border
into the United States. FBI Authorization Hearings, supra note 32, at 325.
In 1988, a New Jersey highway patrolman arrested a member of the Japanese Red
Army (JRA), a terrorist organization that trains in Lebanon and has conducted strikes
against civilian targets in Western Europe and the Middle East. United States v.
Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1090-97 (3d Cir. 1990). A search of the suspect's car pro-
duced explosives, bomb paraphernalia, and maps indicating he intended to blow up a
Navy recruiting center in New York City. Id. at 1094-95. The prosecution introduced
evidence at trial showing that the JRA's primary target was the United States, and
that the group intended to strike within American borders. Id. at 1097.
Several political assassination attempts have also taken place on American soil.
MULLINS, supra note 16, at 113. In January of 1982, the Justice Commandoes of Ar-
menian Genocide (JCAG) assassinated the Turkish General Consul in Los Angeles. Id.
Four months later, the same group killed the Honorary Turkish General Consul in
Boston. Id. The FBI prevented a third JCAG bombing of the Turkish Consulate in
Philadelphia, which experts said could have killed from 2,000 to 3,000 persons. United
States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 961-63 (9th Cir. 1988). In 1985, the FBI thwarted
Sikh terrorist plans to assassinate Indira Ghandi during her visit to the United States,
and the Chief Minister of the Indian State of Harya when he later visited New Orle-
ans. MULLINS, supra note 16, at 113.
38. See Seib, supra note 35, at AlI (reporting on efforts by Middle East radicals
to influence or disrupt the more recent Middle East peace process). Robert Kuperman,
a terrorism analyst for the Center of Strategic and International Studies, told Seib that
the world will likely see new waves of terrorism as a prelude to and as a consequence of
the recent Middle East peace talks. Id. See also supra note 27 (discussing recent ter-
rorist attacks in response to the recent Middle East peace talks).
39. See infra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing opposition to the proposed
Terrorist Alien Removal Act).
1992] 957
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
activity. Introduced in March 1991 as part of the Bush administra-
tion's version of the Comprehensive Violent Crime Control Bill,40 the
Terrorist Alien Removal Act of 199141 proposed establishing in camera
and ex parte review of classified information used in deporting sus-
pected terrorists.42 Proponents argue that these measures are necessary
to deal with the terrorist threat.43 Members of Congress and many civil
rights organizations, however, attacked these proposals for attempting
to establish star-chamber tribunals."
The preamble of the proposed Terrorist Alien Removal Act states
that present deportation procedures are unsatisfactory in light of De-
partment of Justice findings that many aliens aid or receive instructions
from various international terrorist organizations.45 Under the Terrorist
Alien Removal Act, the Justice Department could request a special re-
40. S. 635, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 721-26 (1991).
41. L. PAUL BREMER, DEP'T. ST. BULL., COUNTERING TERRORISM IN THE 1980s
AND 1990s 61 (1989). President Reagan first introduced the Terrorist Alien Removal
Act in 1988 but no legislative action on the proposal was ever taken. 134 CONG. REC.
H3125 (daily ed. May 10, 1988) (executive communication from the Acting Assistant
Attorney General to the House of Representatives); 134 CONG. REC. S7882 (daily ed.
June 15, 1988) (executive communication from the Acting Secretary Attorney General
to the Senate).
42. S. 635, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 721-26 (1991).
43. See Tom Watson, Obscure Provisions in Bush's Crime Bill Stir Debate,
N.J.L.J., June 13, 1991, at 4 (statement of Steven Valentine, deputy assistant attorney
general, Civil Division, Justice Department) (stating that present immigration law puts
the government in the untenable position of either declassifying information and risking
the life of an informant, or letting a known terrorist remain in the United States). See
also 135 CONG. REC. E815 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1989) (statement of Rep. Solomon)
(arguing that in 1989, 30,000 Iranian students lived in the United States, one-third of
whom were funded by the Ayatollah Khomeini and capable of carrying out terrorist
strikes).
44. See 137 CONG. REC. E2285 (daily ed. June 19, 1991) (statement of Rep. Ed-
wards) (characterizing the in camera and ex parte procedures as offensive to funda-
mental American values); 137 CONG. REC. S8133 (daily ed. June 19, 1991) (statement
of Sen. Cranston) (opposing the proposal to prevent aliens from hearing the evidence
against them). See also Secret Trials, WASH. POST, June 19, 1991, at A18 (criticizing
the lack of procedural protections afforded an alien under the special removal proce-
dures); Watson, supra note 43, at 4 (reporting on a May 1991 American Civil Liber-
ties Union (ACLU) meeting of immigration and defense lawyers to analyze the depor-
tation provisions); Cole, Secret Tribunal, supra note 8, at 581 (arguing that the
administration's version of the crime bill results in secret deportation proceedings based
on an alien's political affiliations).
45. S. 635, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 722 (1991). Specifically, the bill states:
the Department of Justice has obtained considerable evidence of involvement in
terrorism by aliens in the United States. Both legal aliens, such as lawful perma-
nent residents and aliens here on student visas, and illegal aliens are known to
have aided and to have received instructions regarding terrorist acts from various
international terrorist groups. While many of these aliens would be subject to
deportation proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
these proceedings are unsatisfactory in cases involving sensitive information.
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moval hearing whenever it believes that public disclosure of certain evi-
dence would adversely affect national security or foreign relations, or
would reveal a confidential source or important investigative tech-
nique."6 A specially appointed judge would then review the government
evidence ex parte and in camera. Upon a finding of probable cause
that the alien has engaged in terrorist activity, and when part of the
government's argument is composed of sensitive national security infor-
mation, a special removal hearing would be ordered. 8
Thereafter, the proposal required a public hearing in which the gov-
ernment bears the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence
that the alien engaged in terrorist activity.49 Neither the alien nor the
public would be able to view any confidential or sensitive evidence
presented to the judge in camera and ex parte.10 The alien would be
entitled to a summary of the evidence, if the sensitive elements can be
redacted.5 1 A summary would not be issued, however, if a censored ver-
sion of the evidence might result in the death or serious bodily injury of
an informant.5
2
The administration's proposal also would have established a special
court to hear the removal cases53 comprised of Article III judges" ap-
pointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Unlike typical ex-
clusion and deportation hearings presided over by administrative
judges, the special removal court would consist of five federal court
46. S. 635, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 502(a) (1991). Section 502(a) requires the
Department of Justice to state in its application for a special removal hearing that
normal deportation proceedings "would pose a risk to the national security of the
United States, adversely affect foreign relations, reveal an investigative technique im-
portant to efficient law enforcement, or disclose a confidential source of information. Id.
47. S. 635, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 502(c) (1991).
48. S. 635, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 502(c)(1)-(2). At the time of the application for
a special removal hearing, the Attorney General may take the suspected alien into
custody without the possibility of judicial review. Id. § 502(b). If the judge denied the
application, the government may appeal to the Court of Appeals within twenty days,
during which the Attorney General may still retain custody of the alien. Id. §
502(d)(1). If the government makes no appeal, the government must release the alien
unless such alien can be arrested for other immigration violations. Id. § 502(d)(2).
49. S. 635, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 502(h) (1991). Section 502(h) requires hearings
be open to the public and aliens to have the right to be represented by counsel. Id.
Section 502(m) states that the standard of proof used in all deportation proceedings,
clear and convincing evidence, is the most appropriate standard for special removal
hearings. Id. § 502(m).
50. S. 635, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 502(j).
51. S. 635, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 502(e)(l)(A).
52. S. 635, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. § 502(e)(I)(A)-(B).
53. S. 635, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. § 503(a). The judges would serve five year terms
to which they may be reappointed. Id. § 503(c).
54. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.
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judges. 5 Although at least one observer decribed the proposal as a
"terror court," the use of similar tribunals for handling classified infor-
mation has been upheld as constitutional."6 Commentators also note
that avoiding the use of administrative judges, who work for and are
paid by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), mitigates
the appearance of bias when adjudicating immigration cases.
57
Criticism of the proposed Terrorist Alien Removal Act came from
two fronts. First, the definition of "terrorist activity," as the standard
for invoking the special removal hearings was so broad that critics
feared it would have a chilling effect on the free speech and association
rights of resident aliens."8 Second, it was also argued that enactment of
the proposed measures would violate the fundamental due process
rights of resident aliens.59
55. S. 635, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 503(a).
56. See No Terror Court for the U.S., N.Y. TiMES, June 20, 1991, at A22 (com-
paring the special court established by the Terrorist Alien Removal Act to the so-called
"kangaroo" courts employed by Kuwait, which resulted in summary sentences to per-
sons who collaborated with Iraqi occupiers during the Persian Gulf War). The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) created a court similar to that proposed by the
Terrorist Alien Removal Act. 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (1988). Under FISA, the Supreme
Court Chief Justice appoints seven district court judges to serve seven-year terms al-
though these subjects are not subject to reappointment. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a),(d)
(1988).
In United States v. Cavanaugh, 807 F.2d 787, 791-92 (9th Cir. 1987), the defendant
argued that the special FISA court was unconstitutional because the statute did not
provide for life tenure of its judges. Id. at 791. The Ninth Circuit found that the tem-
porary designation of FISA judges in no way undermined their judicial independence.
Id. at 792. Unlike FISA, however, the Terrorist Alien Removal Act permits the reap-
pointment of its judges. S. 635, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 503 (1991). Thus, future
legislation should consider limiting the time judges may sit on the Terrorist Removal
Court to one term. See also United States v. Megehey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1197
(E.D.N.Y. 1982), affid, 729 F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1983) (ruling that the finite terms of
FISA judges ensure the judicial independence of the judges).
57. See The Transformation of Immigration Law, supra note 1, at 30-34 (examin-
ing the role of INS judges in immigration cases). Prior to 1952, immigration inspectors
often adjudicated the same cases that they investigated. Id. at 32. The 1952 Immigra-
tion Act, however, prohibits an immigration inspector from presiding over a hearing in
which that individual served as an investigator or prosecutor. Id. Nevertheless, Profes-
sor Schuck questions whether impartiality can be achieved so long as both the immi-
gration judge and "prosecutor" are employed by the same agency. Id. at 30.
58. See No Terror Court For the U.S., supra note 57, at 22 (stating that the gov-
ernment's definition of "terrorist activity" is broad enough to encompass fundraising
for the African National Congress and the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO)); Cole, Secret Tribunal, supra note 8, at 581 (arguing that the administration's
version of the crime bill would establish secret deportation proceedings for aliens the
administration finds politically undesirable).
59. See Watson, supra note 43, at 4 (noting that current law allows the use of
confidential evidence to exclude aliens, but such procedures threaten the rights of aliens
already in the country).
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II. COUNTERTERRORISM AS IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION
The United States has a long history of relying upon xenophobic im-
migration policies to protect itself against spies, saboteurs, and subver-
sives.6 0 These laws have been used not only to expel those individuals
who sought to destroy the government, but also those who merely disa-
gree with its policies."1 Recent anti-terrorism policies are quickly be-
coming the tools of ideological exclusion in the new world order in the
same way that anti-communism policies were used during the Cold
War. 62
A. NATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY
1. Immigration Legislation: A History of Ideological Exclusion
The United States has long feared the arrival of immigrants who do
not to seek the shelter of its freedoms, but instead work toward the
destruction of its government.6 3 Since the early twentieth century, Con-
gress legislated these fears into immigration restrictions and blurred
the lines between national security and ideological exclusion!" Al-
though recent legislative action moves away from ideological immigra-
tion restrictions, the terrorist exception remains a broad loophole
through which the government may exclude and deport political
undesirables. 5
60. See Alexander Wohl, Comment, Free Speech and the Right of Entry Into the
United States: Legislation to Remedy the Ideological Exclusion Provisions of the Im-
migration and Naturalization Act, 4 AM. U. J. lrr'L L. & POL'Y 443, 447-59 (1989)
(proffering that the harshest immigration restrictions are enacted during times of inter-
national turmoil and high volume immigration).
61. See infra text accompanying notes 63-75 (reviewing the evolution of immigra-
tion policies which seek to protect national security from subversive individuals and
organizations).
62. See infra text accompanying notes 76-88 (examining legislation which replaces
anti-communism deportation guidelines with anti-terrorism restrictions).
63. See Wohl, supra note 60, at 447-59 (discussing United States immigration law
and its history of excluding communists, anarchists, and other alleged subversives
based on evidence of their political beliefs).
64. Id. In 1990, Congress repealed sections of the McCarren-Walter Act which
denied temporary visas to aliens because of their political beliefs and associations.
Steven A. Holmes, Legislation Eases Limits on Aliens, N.Y. TaitEs, Feb. 2, 1990, at 6.
However, aliens seeking permanent resident status may still be barred on ideological
grounds. Id. Additionally, the amended legislation leaves intact the Secretary of State's
power to deny entry to anyone believed likely to engage in terrorist activity. Id.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 76-88 (examining recent anti-terrorism im-
migration laws). See also George E. Gruen, The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987-An
Update on the Controversy Surrounding Efforts to Close Down PLO Offices in the
U.S., 11 TERRORISM, 235, 238-39 (1988) (discussing the PLO exception to the Attor-
ney General's authority to recommend a waiver to aliens excluded because of their
affiliation with a proscribed organization).
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In 1903, Congress enacted the first immigration restrictions directed
toward the exclusion of any alien who advocated the use of force to
overthrow the government or the rule of law."" The legislature ex-
panded these provisions in 1918 to permit the deportation of any alien
in the United States who belongs to a subversive organization at their
time of entry or at any time thereafter.67 By 1940, the Alien Registra-
tion Act prohibited the printing, publication, and distribution of any
material that advocated or supported a group seeking to violently over-
throw the federal government or any state government.6 8 Title II of
that Act made deportable any alien who knowingly violated these
prohibitions.6 9 The Internal Security Act of 195070 and the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952, 71 however, authorized the govern-
ment to deport an alien without actually proving that the alien knew
the organization encouraged the violent overthrow of the United States
government.
7 2
Congress also diluted the deportation standard for aliens. The 1952
Immigration and Nationality Act, also known as the McCarren-Walter
Act 7 3 gave the Attorney General the power to exclude any alien enter-
ing the United States if that alien is believed to be plotting any act
prejudicial to the welfare of the nation.74 Between 1952 and 1984, the
United States excluded over 8,000 aliens from ninety-eight countries
66. Immigration Act of 1903, Pub. L. No. 162, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213, 1221
(1903). Specifically, the Act prohibits the entry of any alien who:
disbelieves in or who is opposed to all organized government, or who is a member
of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in
or opposition to all organized government, or who advocates or teaches the duty,
necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or of-
ficers ...of the Government of the United States or of any other organized
government .
Id.
67. Act of Oct. 16, 1918, ch. 186, Pub. L. No. 221, 40 Stat. 1012 (1918).
68. Alien Registration Act, ch. 439, Pub. L. No. 670, 54 Stat. 670 (1940).
69. Id.
70. Internal Security Act, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (1950).
71. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952).
72. See Galvin v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 528 (1954), reh'g denied, 348 U.S. 852
(1954) (holding that the Acts do not require that the government demonstrate the
aliens knew the Communist Party advocated violence in order to deport, only that the
aliens were aware and freely joined the Communist Party). See also Sigurdson v. Lan-
don, 215 F.2d 791, 798 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 916, reh'g denied, 348
U.S. 956 (1955) (holding that the alien's intent, or the possibility of deception with
regard to the alien's membership, is irrelevant for deportation purposes); United States
ex rel. Avramovich v. Lehman, 235 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
905 (1957), reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 925 (1958) (holding that an alien voluntarily join-
ing the Communist Party constitutes grounds sufficient to impose deportation).
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988).
74. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27). Subsection (a)(27) allows the Attorney General to
exclude any alien seeking to enter the United States "to engage in activities which
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under this broad standard because of their political beliefs or
affiliations.
75
2. The Terrorist Exception to Immigration Reform
In the late 1970s, Congress began curbing the expansive power of
the executive branch to exclude or deport aliens because of their politi-
cal beliefs. Each reform, however, contained a provision designed to
prevent terrorist organizations and their supporters from entering the
United States. In 1977, Congress enacted the McGovern amendment
which allowed the Attorney General to waive the exclusion of any alien
because of that person's affiliation with an organization proscribed by
the Immigration and Nationality Act.76 In 1979, however, Congress al-
tered the McGovern Amendment to make the provision inapplicable to
PLO members.7
Congress later implemented the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, which
ordered the closing of a PLO information office in Washington and its
observer mission to the United Nations. 8 Although sponsors praised
the legislation for taking a tough stand against terrorism, critics com-
plained that it violated the rights of free speech and association by lim-
iting American citizens' access to Palestinian concerns and opinions .7
Later that year, Congress temporarily suspended the enforcement of
the ideological exclusion provisions in the Immigration and Nationality
Act.80 For one year, the legislation prevented the exclusion or deporta-
tion of aliens because of their beliefs and associations.8" Not only did
would be prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security
of the United States." Id.
75. See The 1952 McCarren-Walter Act, supra note 1, at 22 (relying on a 1984
internal report by the Immigration and Naturalization Service which estimates the
number of aliens excluded under the McCarren-Walter provisions).
76. 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (1988).
77. See George E. Gruen, The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987-An Update on the
Controversy Surrounding Efforts to Close Down PLO Offices in the US., II TERROR-
ism 235, 237-38 (1988) (discussing legislative efforts to pressure the PLO into renounc-
ing the use of terrorism by removing their representatives from the United States).
78. Id. at 235.
79. Id. Senator Dole said such action was necessary "to strengthen the defenses of
[the United States] against the real, physical threat that the PLO represents." Id. On
the other hand, Morton Halperin, Washington, D.C. director of the ACLU, stated that
the legislation violates the freedoms of speech and association by preventing Americans
from seeking to advance the political ideology of an organization, including those based
exterritorially. Id. at 236.
80. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 901, 101 Stat.
1399, 1399-1400 (1987).
81. Id. See The 1952 McCarren-Walter Act, supra note 1, at 22 (discussing the
United States government policy of excluding Arab groups in the name of
counterterrorism).
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Congress make this suspension inapplicable to members of the PLO,
but also extended this ineligibility to any alien directly or indirectly
linked to a group that advocates terrorist activity.8 2 Thus, like earlier
efforts to exclude members of the Communist Party, the government
could deport an alien without proving the alien knew the suspect group
ever committed or advocated an act of terrorism. 83
In 1990, Congress declared illegal the denial of temporary visas to
aliens because of their political or ideological beliefs. 8' Again, the mea-
sure allowed the Secretary of State to deny visas to any alien believed
to have engaged or is likely to engage in terrorist activity.85 Later that
year, the Immigration and Nationality Act expanded the definition of
engaging in terrorist activity. 86 Under that definition, an alien may be
deported if the alien negligently assists someone who has committed, is
planning, or can be linked to a terrorist act or organization. 87 Such
assistance includes unknowingly housing, transporting, or funding a
suspected terrorist.88
Thus, as Congress moves to restrict the ideological exclusion provi-
sions of the Cold War era, the scope of the executive branch's power to
label an alien a terrorist expands. The Terrorist Alien Removal Act
proposes to hide the government's rationale for affixing the label of
"terrorist" to a resident alien from both the alien and the public.
B. COUNTERTERRORISM OR COUNTERACTIVISM?
Although the occurrence of domestic terrorist incidents has declined
dramatically since the 1970s,89 the government's counterterrorism pro-
gram is increasingly under fire for harassing resident aliens who vocal-
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 101-246, 104 Stat. 15
(1990).
85. Id.
86. See infra text accompanying note 107 (examining the definition of "terrorist
activity" under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990).
87. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §
(a)(3)(B)(iii), 104 Stat. 4978, 5070 (1990).
88. Id. at § 601(a)(3)(B)(iii).
89. See supra note 29 (discussing the decline of domestic terrorist incidents).
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ize their opposition to United States foreign policy. 0 In 1988, Repre-
sentative Don Edwards, the chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Civil and Constitutional Rights, requested a General Accounting Office
(GAO) audit of the FBI's domestic counterterrorism program."' Repre-
sentative Edwards asked the GAO to determine the extent to which the
FBI opens investigations of United States citizens without any suspi-
cion of criminal conduct. 2 The results reveal a practice of monitoring
the political activities of United States citizens and resident aliens.
90. See Eve Pell, Kicking Out Palestinians, THE NATION, Feb. 5, 1990, at 167
(arguing that FBI and INS raids on resident alien Palestinians in 1988 in Los Angeles
were politically motivated as an attempt to quell domestic dissent over United States
policies toward the Middle East). See also FBI Investigations of First Amendment
Activities: Hearings Before the Subconun. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 120-21 app. 2 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter Hearings on FBI Domestic Terrorism Investigations] (GAO report to the chairman
of the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights) (reporting that in the
mid-1980s the New York-based Center for Constitutional Rights accused the FBI of
improperly investigating the legitimate political activities of members of the Committee
in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES)). A subsequent internal FBI
inquiry denied that the agency lacked justification for looking into alleged terrorist
activities by CISPES, but admitted mismanagement of the investigation. Id.
91. Hearings on FBI Domestic Terrorism Investigations, supra note 90, at 63
(statement of Arnold Jones, Director, Administration of Justice Issues, General Gov-
ernment Division, United States GAO). On December 1, 1981, President Reagan is-
sued Executive Order 12333, which expands the FBI's authority to investigate any vio-
lent act attempting to overthrow or impair the federal government. Id. at 121 n.l app.
2. Specifically, the purpose of the Counterterrorism Program is to:
detect, prevent, and react to unlawful violent activities of individuals or groups
whose intent is to (1) overthrow the government; (2) interfere with the activities
of a foreign government in the United States; (3) impair the functioning of the
federal government, a state government, or interstate commerce; or (4) deprive
Americans of their civil rights.
Id. One year later, the President assigned the FBI the principal responsibility of com-
batting terrorism in the United States. The FBI's Mission, supra note 17, at 2. In
1982, counterterrorism joined a select list of FBI national priorities which include
counterintelligence, white-collar crime, organized crime, narcotics, and violent crime.
Id. Since then, the GAO estimates that the FBI opened approximately 19,500 investi-
gations against United States citizens, aliens, and resident aliens suspected of con-
ducting, supporting, or contributing to terrorist activity. Hearings on FBI Domestic
Terrorism Investigations, supra note 90, at 126 app. 2 (GAO report to the chairman of
the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights).
92. Hearings on FBI Domestic Terrorism Investigations, supra note 90, at 59
(statement of Rep. Edwards). The Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights
held a special hearing upon learning that the FBI did not provide the GAO auditors,
who had top security clearances and worked in the FBI headquarters, with full access
to counterterrorism investigative files. Id. The reason proffered by the FBI for the lim-
ited disclosure was the need to protect the security of confidential informants and inves-
tigative techniques. Id. at 64. The FBI eventually turned over nearly all of the files
requested by the GAO. Id. at 61. The FBI, however, redacted so much information
from some of the files that GAO auditors could not discern the motivations for particu-
lar investigations. Id. at 81-82.
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In nearly half of the over 18,000 counterterrorism investigations
opened between 1982 and 1988, the FBI found no evidence of criminal
conduct."3 The FBI opened such investigations because an informant or
some other evidence alleged that the subject of the inquiry could be
linked to a terrorist group. 4 The GAO also estimates that thirty-eight
percent of the investigations focus on United States citizens or perma-
nent resident aliens. 5 The FBI allegedly monitored the First Amend-
ment activities of groups and individuals in 2,080 investigations, 951 of
which involved United States citizens or resident aliens."
As this data reveals, American citizens and resident aliens are moni-
tored, and subject to possible prosecution or deportation merely be-
cause of their political expressions and associations."' This investigatory
focus on political activities may result in a chilling effect on the First
93. Hearings on FBI Domestic Terrorism Investigations, supra note 90, at 80 (re-
sponse of John Anderson, Assistant Director, Administration of Justice Issues, General
Government Division, GAO). The GAO estimates that forty-five percent of the investi-
gations found no criminal activity. Id.
94. Hearings on FBI Domestic Terrorism Investigations, supra note 90, at 80
(question of James Dempsey, Assistant Counsel, House Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights).
95. Hearings on FBI Domestic Terrorism Investigations, supra note 90, at 115
app. 2 (GAO report to the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Civil and Consti-
tutional Rights).
96. Hearings on FBI Domestic Terrorism Investigations, supra note 90, at 116
app. 2. First Amendment activities include public speeches, attending meetings, partici-
pating in demonstrations, and appearing on radio or television broadcasts. Id. at 132
app. 2. When citizens or resident aliens are the subject of a terrorism investigation, the
Justice Department's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) must determine
whether the investigation complies with the procedural guidelines of the Attorney Gen-
eral. Id. at 124 app. 2. If the OIPR believes that an investigation is unwarranted, it
may halt the inquiry. Id. According to the GAO report on FBI counterterrrorism inves-
tigations, conducted between 1982 and 1988, the OIPR never recommended the termi-
nation of an investigation. Id.
97. Cf. United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1194-1200 (1982), aff'd, 729
F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1983) (examining the extent to which evidence of First Amendment
activities may be used to obtain a warrant for domestic electronic surveillance under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)). In 1978, Congress enacted FISA,
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1988), in response to executive branch abuses, which had
authorized the warrantless electronic surveillance of persons in the United States.
Megahey, 553 F. Supp. at 1184. Section 1805 of FISA permits the issuance of an order
approving an electronic surveillance if probable cause exists to believe the target of the
surveillance is a foreign power or agent thereof. 50 U.S.C. § 1805. First Amendment
activities may constitute the sole basis of a FISA request for surveillance, if the target
is a United States citizen or resident alien. Id. This restriction does not apply if such a
person acts for a group or government that engages in terrorism. Id. § 1801. Thus,
Congress has implicitly recognized that, not only may the FBI monitor the First
Amendment activities of United States residents, but it is also given greater latitude in
instances in which persons affiliate with terrorist groups or governments.
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Amendment freedoms of resident aliens and citizens. 8 The problem,
according to critics, is that deciding who is a terrorist and, thus, subject
to deportation is a highly political question. 9 This danger, however, is
difficult to avoid when combatting a form of violence that escapes defi-
nition and is often politically motivated.100
Many terrorist groups commit acts of violence with a set political
goal in mind.101 Focusing on the political purposes of terrorism as a
means to identify terrorists, however, creates several difficulties. First, a
person may advocate the same political goals as terrorist groups with-
out ever advocating the use of violence to achieve those goals.102 Sec-
ond, many terrorist groups operate with no political purpose except the
98. See Watson, supra note 43, at 4 (quoting Jeanne Woods, legislative counsel of
the ACLU, who notes that the use of a broad definition of "terrorist activity" in the
1991 Terrorist Alien Removal Act, discussed infra, would chill the political expressions
of those fearing deportation).
99. See David Johnston, Crime Bill Would Establish Alien Deportation Tribunal,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 1, 1991, at A6 (quoting David Cole, attorney for the Center for
Constitutional Rights, who predicts that an administration will define terrorists to in-
clude those it finds to be politically unacceptable).
100. See FARRELL, supra note 16, at 6-13 (discussing attempts to define terrorism).
An acceptable definition of terrorism has been the subject of debate as early as the first
half of this century. In 1937, the League of Nations formulated a definition of terror-
ism in the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. Id. at 7. The
convention defined terrorism as "acts directed against a State and intended or calcu-
lated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or the general pub-
lic." Id. Since then, hundreds of definitions have been offered, and each has been criti-
cized as either being too broad or too narrow. MULLUNS. supra note 16, at 35. After
examining several definitions, Mullins has praised the description of terrorism offered
by B. M. Jenkins. Id. Jenkins defines terrorism as:
the threat of violence, individual acts of violence, or a campaign of violence
designed to instill fear. . . . Terrorism is violence for effect; not only, and some-
times not at all, for the effect on the actual victims of the terrorists. In fact, the
victim may be totally unrelated to the terrorist's cause. Terrorism is violence
aimed at the people watching. Fear is the intended effect, not the byproduct of
terrorism.
Id.
Mullins adds that this definition unearths four important elements involved in terror-
ist acts. Id. at 36. First, a threat alone, without any executed acts of violence, may
constitute terrorism. Id. Second, the fear of terrorism changes the behavior and policies
of others. Id. Third, violence is only a tool, and not the purpose of terrorism. Id. Fi-
nally, violence is not used to affect the behavior of the terrorist's victims, but to influ-
ence its audience. Id.
101. See MULLINS, supra note 16, at 67 (noting that one characteristic common to
many terrorists is their commitment to a political goal and the desire to make a panic-
ular government appear oppressive).
102. See Warren Strobel, U.S., Israel Choose Not to Hear PLO's Voice, WASH.
TIMEs, Sept. 2, 1992, at A7 (reporting that during Middle East Peace talks, Israeli
leaders welcomed negotiations with Palestinian representatives so long as they had no
ties to the Palestinian Liberation Organization).
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destruction of the status quo.103 Third, how well the political and social
ends of militaristic groups parallel American interests often dictates
who the United States decides to condemn as a terrorist or praise as a
freedom fighter.'04
Furthermore, the expression of certain political beliefs which do not
compliment United States policy often makes resident aliens immedi-
ately suspect as terrorists. 0° For the most part, Americans do not con-
demn the political goals of terrorism as much as they fear the violent
tactics employed to achieve those goals."0 6 Thus, commentators stress
that efforts to define terrorism must focus on the conduct of terrorism,
rather than the motivations of terrorism.' 07
In conducting investigations, the FBI views terrorism as the unlawful
use of violence to intimidate or coerce civilians or government policy. 10 8
103. See DAVID C. MARTIN & JOHN WALCOTT, BEST LAID PLANS 53 (1988)
(describing the Baader-Meinhoff organization of Germany and the Italian-based Red
Brigades as nihilist groups with no identifiable political agenda).
104. See The FBI's Mission, supra note 17, at 1 (rejecting the argument that "one
man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter"). Sessions argues that, unlike ter-
rorists, freedom fighters, liberators, and urban guerillas do not deliberately target non-
combatants and innocent civilians. Id. Instead, such groups limit their attacks to mili-
tary targets. Id. Stansfield Turner, former Director of Central Intelligence (1977-81),
notes that George Schultz advanced the same argument as Secretary of State for the
Reagan administration. STANSFIELD TURNER, TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY 181
(1991). Turner points out, however, that the Nicaraguan contras, although often called
"freedom fighters," investigated and purged their own forces for perpetrators of abuses
against Nicaraguan civilians. Id. He candidly admits: "[T]he contras were freedom
fighters because we shared their political aims, but the Shiite fundamentalists were
terrorists because we did not." Id.
105. See The 1952 McCarren-Walter Act, supra note 1, at 22 (arguing that the
State Department and the INS pursue the exclusion and deportation of aliens because
of their associations with terrorist groups, regardless of whether the alien ever partici-
pated in an act of terrorism). See also infra note 117 and accompanying text (observ-
ing that not all nations that engage in terrorism are listed on the State Department's
list of state sponsors of terrorism).
106. See MULLINS, supra note 16, at 30-31 (discussing terrorism's use of fear to
influence the behavior of others). Mullins notes that the most important component of
terrorism is terror. Id. Terrorists attempt to influence the behavior of others by creating
the perception that violence will result unless their demands are met. Id.
107. See TURNER, supra note 104, at 181 (calling for the removal of political con-
siderations from the definition of terrorism). Turner suggests using a definition of ter-
rorism first proposed by the CIA in 1980. Id. According to that definition, terrorism is
"[tihe threat of use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups . . .
when such actions are intended to shock, stun, or intimidate a target group wider than
the immediate victims." Id. This definition, however, does not remove a consideration
of the political purposes of terrorism. As Mullins points out, not every terrorist act is
political. MULLINS, supra note 16, at 34. Terrorist acts may be executed against ethnic
or religious groups without any consideration of a political objective. Id. For example,
the Members of the Christian Identity Movement advocate the killing and deportation
of racial and religious minorities to facilitate the second coming of Christ. Id. at 68.
108. Hearings on FBI Domestic Terrorism Investigations, supra note 90, at 122
app. 2 (GAO report to the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Civil and Consti-
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The FBI's definition requires that one must commit a crime, such as
murder or conspiracy, before being branded as a terrorist. 109 At least
one federal district court has noted that the FBI's formulation makes
arriving at a definition of the term terrorist more of an objective ques-
tion of fact and less of a political decision.110 Present immigration law
does not require evidence of a crime before an alien can be excluded or
deported for engaging in terrorist activity."' Terrorist activity may in-
tutional Rights). The FBI uses the statutory definition of international terrorism. 18
U.S.C.A. § 2331 (West Supp. 1991). Id. Subsection one states:
the term "international terrorism" means activities that-
(A)involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of
the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a crimi-
nal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any
State;
(B)appear to be intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii)to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and
(C)occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or
transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accom-
plished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in
which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.
Id.
109. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2331 (West Supp. 1991).
110. See United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1196 (E.D.N.Y. 1982),
af'd, 729 F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that the statutory definition of interna-
tional terrorism found in FISA is identical to the definition used by the FBI). In
Megahey, defendants, charged with attempting to export weapons to the Irish Republi-
can Army, challenged the statutory definition of international terrorism. Id. Asserting
that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter," the defendants argued that
the definition would embroil courts in difficult political questions. Id. The court held
that the statutory definition of terrorism requires proof of certain facts (i.e., perpetra-
tion of a crime) which does not implicate foreign policy. Id.; see also United States v.
Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that international terrorism, by defi-
nition, involves activities which constitute crimes).
111. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104
Stat. 4978, 5070 (1990). Section 601(a)(3)(B)(iii) declares that to engage in terrorist
activity means:
to commit, in an individual capacity or as a member of an organization, an act of
terrorist activity or an act which the actor knows, or reasonably should know,
affords material support to any individual, organization, government in con-
ducting a terrorist activity at any time, including any of the following acts:
(I) The preparation or planning of a terrorist activity.
(II) The gathering of information on potential targets for terrorist activity.
(III) The providing of any type of material support, including a safe house,
transportation, communications, funds, false identification, weapons, explosives,
or training, to any individual the actor knows or has reason to believe has com-
mitted or plans to commit an act of terrorist activity.
(IV) The soliciting of funds or other things of value for terrorist activity or for
any terrorist organization.
(V) The solicitation of any individual for membership in a terrorist organiza-
tion, terrorist government, or to engage in terrorist activity.
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clude collecting information or recruiting members for a terrorist or-
ganization or government." 2 Further, an alien may be deported for
negligently and unknowingly assisting or supporting a terrorist
entity."'
Under this definition, those who publicly support the efforts of orga-
nizations, such as the Irish Republican Army or the PLO, may be sub-
ject to deportation. Due to the rise of state-sponsored terrorism, aliens
from countries such as Syria, Iran, and Libya are easily encompassed
by this broad definition.1" At least one commentator recognizes that
during the 1980s, Nicaragua, North Korea, Czechoslovakia, and the
former Soviet Union did not appear on the State Department's list of
government sponsors of terrorism despite the involvement of these
countries in terrorist activity.1 5 Thus, an alien's ability to remain in
the United States may depend on national origin as well as the political
decisions of the State Department. The following examination of the
government's counterterrorism program of the 1980s reveals that aliens
of particular nationalities were targeted for wholesale deportation.
C. THE NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAM
In January 1986, President Reagan issued a top-secret National Se-
curity Decision Directive which created the National Program for
Combatting Terrorism." 6 This Directive also established the Alien
Border Control Committee (ABCC or Committee) whose express pur-
pose is to prevent suspected terrorists from entering or remaining in the
United States."' Examination of the ABCC provisions reveals, how-
112. Id.
113. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 5067, 5070
(1990). Present immigration law employs a negligence standard for determining when
an alien may be deported. The Immigration Act of 1990 makes deportable any alien
who commits an act which the "actor knows, or reasonably should know" assists terror-
ist activity. Id. Activities which aliens should know constitutes terrorist activity in-
cludes the gathering of information, fundraising, or recruiting for groups or govern-
ments the State Department lists as sponsors of terrorism. Id.
114. See supra note 35 (discussing the rise of state-sponsored terrorism).
115. Livingston & Arnold, supra note 35, at 20-21.
116. See Eve Pell, Kicking Out Palestinians, THE NATION, Feb. 5, 1990, at 167-68
(discussing INS efforts to deport seven Palestinians and one Kenyan because of their
vocal opposition to United States foreign policy). Although President Reagan issued
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 207 in 1986, it did not become public
until the summer of 1989 by a Freedom of Information Act request by the ACLU. Id.
117. Id. The ABCC's birth was based on the perceived need to avoid those
problems faced by the Carter administration in monitoring the activities of Iranian
students in the United States during the Iran hostage crisis. Ronald L. Soble, INS




ever, a plan to deport large numbers of Arab aliens, targeted exclu-
sively because of their nationality.1 18 Parts of this plan, which recom-
mended the rigorous use of in camera procedures to protect classified
information, resurfaced in the recent Terrorist Alien Removal Act.
However, the low level of international terrorist activity in the United
States questions the necessity for implementing such a broad-based
proposal." 9
According to an INS interagency report, the ABCC considered two
scenarios for removing not only suspected terrorists, but any alien
found to be "politically undesirable." 120 The first option invalidates the
visas of all nonimmigrant aliens of a particular nationality.1 2' These
immigrants would then be required to register with the INS so that the
INS can identify the number, location, and characteristics of a particu-
lar group of targeted immigrants.12 2 The report, however, acknowledges
that the INS should distinguish between those aliens who threaten na-
118. See infra text accompanying notes 120-32 (discussing recommendations of the
ABCC). The INS stated that the ABCC proposals would be used if the government
found that national security required the rounding up of a large group of aliens. Mir-
iam Davidson, Militarizing the Mexican Border, THE NATIoN, April 1, 1991 at 406.
Soon after the issuance of these recommendations, however, the INS and FBI aggres-
sively pursued the deportation of several Arab aliens and accused them of supporting
terrorist organizations. See infra text accompanying notes 133-47 (discussing the FBI's
and INS's efforts in deporting Arab aliens). Many of the same recommendations ap-
peared in the recently proposed Terrorist Alien Removal Act. In 1987, an INS spokes-
person, however, declined to outline which ABCC recommendations the government
was pursuing. Ronald L. Soble, INS Labels Terrorist Emergency Proposal Just an
"Option Paper", L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 1987, at 31.
119. See Legislation to Implement the Recommendations of the Comm'n on War-
time Relocation and Internment of Civilians: Hearings on H.R. 442 Before the Sub-
comm. on Admin. Law and Gov't Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1987) [hereinafter, Internment Compensation Hearings]
(INS interagency report entitled, Alien Terrorists and Undesirables: A Contingency
Plan). An INS interagency report acknowledged that international terrorism has been
confined to Western Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East. Id. The report stated,
however, that because of the increasing likelihood of terrorist activities on American
soil, government agencies should make contingency plans to protect "the national se-
curity and public safety." Id.
120. Internment Compensation Hearings, supra note 119, at 62-63 (memorandum
from Robert Walsh, Assistant Commissioner, Customs Office of Intelligence regarding
organization of the ABCC). A special working group was created within the ABCC
with the purpose of establishing procedures for the expulsion of alien activists whose
activities do not conform to their immigration status, and deportation of aliens who
support terrorism efforts. Id. The ABCC created another working group charged with
establishing new visa restrictions "for aliens from certain countries or aliens of certain
categories who are likely to be supportive of terrorist activity within the United
States." Id. at 62.
121. Internment Compensation Hearings, supra note 119, at 72.
122. Internment Compensation Hearings. supra note 119, at 72-74. The INS re-
port indicates that the suggested strategy would tax the administrative capabilities of
federal immigration and law enforcement agencies. Id. More important, the report ac-
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tional security from those who seek asylum from their country of ori-
gin.' 23 Nationalities that the INS focuses upon include Libya, Syria,
Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Algeria, and Morocco.' 24
The second strategy calls for the collection of data from agencies
such as the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in order to
compile a list of undesirable aliens and suspected terrorists. 2  This in-
formation may be used to initiate investigations of aliens in order to
locate and apprehend the suspects.' 26 The program, which anticipates
apprehending up to 1,000 aliens in its opening stages, also called for
the use of internment camps to house the detainees .
27
Upon locating and apprehending undesirables and suspected ter-
rorists, the ABCC recommends rapid deportation, while taking all nec-
essary steps to protect classified information.128 Any alien suspected of
terrorism, or who officially represents a country that sponsors terrorism,
would be routinely detained without bond and the government may op-
pose any appeal for the alien's conditional release. 29 The Committee
also calls for vigorous use of federal regulations permitting the use of in
camera proceedings to protect classified information. 30 Additionally,
the ABCC proposal sought to amend regulations which restrict the use
of in camera proceedings to classified information only; the amended
regulations would allow in camera review of merely confidential infor-
knowledged that the plan discriminates by categorizing people solely on the basis of
national origin rather than upon their political opinion. Id.
123. Internment Compensation Hearings, supra note 119, at 70.
124. Internment Compensation Hearings, supra note 119, at 84.
125. Internment Compensation Hearings, supra note 119, at 74.
126. Internment Compensation Hearings, supra note 119, at 74.
127. Internment Compensation Hearings, supra note 119, at 91-93 (report entitled
"Border Patrol Response to an En Bloc Registration or En Bloc Revocation of NIV
Status of a Class of Aliens") (discussing plans for the detention of aliens apprehended
through the proposed registration strategy). Alien Border Control Committee plans
create three stages for the detention of aliens, contingent upon the number of aliens
apprehended. The first stage anticipates the apprehension of 200 to 500 aliens. Id. Ex-
isting INS holding facilities would be employed with a moderate reallocation of re-
sources. Id. If the INS apprehends between 500 and 1,000 aliens, a detention center in
Oakdale, Louisiana would be employed. Id. Should over 1,000 aliens be detained, mili-
tary facilities would house the aliens, and camps would be built using tents as tempo-
rary quarters. Id.
128. Internment Compensation Hearings, supra note 119, at 62-63 (memorandum
from Robert Walsh, Assistant Commissioner, Customs Office of Intelligence regarding
organization of the ABCC).
129. Internment Compensation Hearings, supra note 119, at 75 (INS interagency
report entitled, Alien Terrorists and Undesirables: A Contingency Plan).
130. Internment Compensation Hearings, supra note 119, at 75.
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mation. a3' The Committee also recommends that the government rou-
tinely request the exclusion of the public from deportation hearings. 3
Less than one year after the creation of the ABCC, 133 FBI and INS
agents raided the Los Angeles homes of six Palestinians and one
Kenyan.'34 Days later, agents apprehended another Palestinian as he
took a college exam.1 3 5 The INS accused all eight of supporting the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a suspected ter-
rorist organization, and subjected each to deportation proceedings. 38
The INS originally sought deportation under the McCarren-Walter
Act, which permits the expulsion of any alien who circulates material
espousing the doctrines of communism, or advocating the injury of per-
sons or destruction of property. 3 7 At trial, a federal district court re-
fused to hear evidence which the government argued must be kept se-
cret. 3" The court then found that resident aliens are entitled to the
same First Amendment protections enjoyed by citizens. 3 ' Because the
131. Internment Compensation Hearings, supra note 119, at 75. Specifically, 8
C.F.R. § 242.17(a) (1991) provides that when an alien seeks discretionary relief from
deportation, the court may review, in camera, government evidence which is classified
under Executive Order No. 12,356. This executive order creates three levels of classi-
fied material: Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential. Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed.
Reg. 14,874 (1982). Such information may be designated by the President, department
heads, and specially designated officials. Id.
132. Internment Compensation Hearings, supra note 119, at 75.
133. Id. at 58 (memorandum from Walter Cadman, Senior Special Agent, Investi-
gation Division, INS). The ABCC formed on June 27, 1986. Id.
134. Eve Pell, Kicking Out Palestinians, THE NATiON, Feb. 5, 1990, at 167. One of
the persons arrested, Khader Hamide, a resident alien and marketing consultant active
in the Rainbow Coalition, has lived in the United States since 1971. Id. The govern-
ment denied any connection between the ABCC and INS efforts to deport the Pales-
tinians. Id. at 168.
135. Id. at 167.
136. Id. After the 1967 Six Day War between Israel and the combined forces of
Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, the PFLP emerged as a radical faction of the PLO. MARtnN
& WALCOTT, supra note 103, at 55. The PFLP led the spread of worldwide terrorism,
vowing to strike not only at targets in Israel, but at any Jewish property throughout the
world. Id.
137. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060,
1062 (C.D. Cal. 1989), affid in part, revd in part, 940 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1991).
138. Michael J. Ybarra, Long Effort to Deport Terror Suspects Raises Difficult
Rights Issues, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1991, at Al.
139. 714 F. Supp. at 1074-82. The court rejected the government's argument that
because Congress has traditionally exercised plenary power over immigration, an
alien's First Amendment rights are substantially limited in the deportation context. Id.
at 1075. The court did not find persuasive the government's assertion that because First
Amendment rights are limited with regard to prisoners, Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 822 (1974), military personnel, Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974), and
students in a school setting, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969), then such rights are also limited for resident aliens.
714 F. Supp. at 1081. Such limitations, the court noted, apply only within the "limited
settings" of prisons, schools, and military service. Id.
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teaching of communism or mere advocacy does not incite immediate
and imminent unlawful action, the court held that the McCarren-Wal-
ter Act prohibited protected forms of expression and was therefore un-
constitutionally overbroad.' The government continued to pursue the
deportations on charges of routine visa violations. 4
In another case, the INS tried to deport Fouad Rafeedie, a Palestin-
ian-born resident alien who has lived in the United States for fifteen
years. 14 2 The government alleged that Rafeedie traveled to Syria in
1986 to attend a conference of the Palestine Youth Organization which
is an alleged affiliate of the PFLP.'43 Upon his return, the government
initiated summary exclusion proceedings, which are typically reserved
for aliens entering the country for the first time.' The government
argued that even if the length of Rafeedie's absence was not long
enough to destroy his residency status, then the purpose of his trip was
"sufficiently nefarious" to mandate a summary exclusion hearing." 5
The court rejected both arguments, holding that Rafeedie's absence
from the country was insufficient to remove his resident alien status,
thereby entitling him to the due process protections enjoyed by United
States citizens. l'" The court remanded the case to the district court in
order to weigh Rafeedie's due process rights against the national secur-
ity interests of the government. 4
7
Although the government has not admitted that these cases are
linked to ABCC, such INS efforts bear a striking resemblance to many
The same persons incur no First Amendment limitations outside these settings. Id.
The court concludes that the First Amendment rights of aliens may not be limited in a
deportation context, without also curbing their expressive freedoms outside that setting.
Id.
140. Id. at 1082-84. The court relied on City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451
(1987), which stated that a law is overbroad and vague if "reaches a substantial
amount of constitutionally protected conduct." Id. at 451 (quoting Village of Hoffman
Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982)). The court
then cited Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) for the proposition that to pro-
hibit expressed advocacy of conduct, the purpose of the speech must incite or produce
imminent lawlessness and the speech must be likely to produce such conduct. Id. at
447. The provisions of the McCarren-Walter Act could, according to the court, pro-
hibit the wearing of a PFLP button or expression of a PFLP viewpoint. 714 F. Supp. at
1084. Therefore, the court held the provisions were unconstitutionally overbroad. Id.
141. Eve Pell, Kicking Out Palestinians, THE NATION, Feb. 5, 1990, at 167, 168.
142. David Cole, Secret Tribunal, THE NATION, May 6, 1991, at 581.
143. Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 508-09 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
144. Id. at 507-08. By resorting to a summary exclusion hearing, the government
could introduce classified information against Rafeedie without having to reveal, to ei-
ther Rafeedie or the public, the substance of that information. Id.
145. Id. at 521-23.




of the committee's recommendations.1 ' 8 These actions also indicate the
abuses that could have resulted from the enactment of the Terrorist
Alien Removal Act.
III. THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF RESIDENT ALIENS
The Immigration Act of 1990 allows for the deportation of any alien
within the United States who engages in terrorist activity. 1 4 The Ter-
rorist Alien Removal Act would have permitted the government to de-
port an alien by using confidential information, without disclosing such
evidence to the alien or the public. 10 Reconciling the Terrorist Alien
Removal Act with the due process rights of resident aliens appears
problematic since deportation hearings are, theoretically, civil proceed-
ings despite their practical resemblance to criminal prosecutions.
A. THE LIMITED RIGHTS OF RESIDENCY
The government's power to regulate and prohibit immigration begins
with the maxim of international law that every sovereign nation retains
the power to forbid the entry of foreign persons.' 0 ' As a corollary to
this principle, the formulation and administration of immigration law is
the exclusive province of the political branches of government. 02 As a
148. See supra text accompanying notes 117-36 (discussing ABCC recommenda-
tions). During the Persian Gulf War, the Bush administration ordered the tracking and
apprehension of Iraqi students in the United States. Sharon LaFraniere & George
Lardner, U.S. Set to Photograph, Fingerprint All New Iraqi and Kuwaiti Visitors,
WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1991, at A23; James Barron, U.S. Taking Steps to Curb Terror-
ism, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 16, 1991, at A15 (reporting on domestic efforts to guard against
Iraqi led terrorist attacks). These efforts seem to emulate the recommendations of the
ABCC.
149. Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601(a)(3), 104 Stat. 4978, 5069 (to be codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)). The Immigration Act of 1990 added persons engaging in terror-
ist activity to the list of aliens who are deportable through a regular deportation hear-
ing before an immigration judge as provided in 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(B).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 45-56 (examining the provisions of the
Terrorist Alien Removal Act). Section 501(e)(1) of TARA provides that an alien fac-
ing possible deportation is given a summary of the confidential information with the
sensitive material redacted, except when even distributing a summary might cause the
death or serious bodily injury of an informant. S. 635, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §
501(e)(1) (1991).
151. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (acknowledging
that the right to expel or exclude aliens is an inherent and inalienable right of every
sovereign nation). Every sovereign nation has the power to forbid foreigners from enter-
ing the country, and only to admit foreigners under specific prescribed conditions.
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
152. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972) (reiterating that in
order for a country to maintain international relations and its own defense, a sovereign
nation must have the power to exclude).
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result, the Supreme Court gives great deference to the rules and regu-
lations defined by Congress and the executive branch.5 3
Theoretically, aliens seeking initial entry into the United States ask
for the privilege of entry and, therefore, may not claim any right to
constitutional protections. 5 Only the procedures established by Con-
gress constitute due process of law.' 55 Thus, courts will not look beyond
the provisions of a statute to define an alien's rights. 56 Upon entering
the United States, however, an alien establishes ties to the commu-
nity"'57 which cannot be severed without the same constitutional protec-
tions of due process158 afforded to American citizens. 59 Because depor-
tation of a person already within the United States may result in
153. See H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1654 (1952), reprinted in 1952
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1653, 1654 (stating that "[t]he power and authority of the United
States, as an attribute of sovereignty, either to prohibit or regulate immigration of
aliens are plenary and Congress may choose such agencies as it pleases to carry out
whatever policy or rule of exclusion it may adopt and, so long as such agencies do not
transcend limits of authority or abuse discretion reposed in them, their judgment is not
open to challenge or review by courts.") The Supreme Court acknowledges Congress'
plenary power over matters of immigration in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130
U.S. 581 (1889). There, the Court found that if Congress "considers the presence of
foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be
dangerous to its peace and security .... its determination is conclusive upon the judici-
ary." Id. at 606.
Professor Schuck rejects suggestions that the tradition of judicial deference in immi-
gration cases is linked to the fact that aliens lack the capacity to vote, or to the refusal
by the courts to enter into questions of foreign policy. The Transformation of Immi-
gration Law, supra note I, at 14-18. Instead, Professor Schuck notes that the pattern
of judicial restraint is subtly connected to the idea of national sovereignty. Id. at 17.
154. See, e.g., United States ex ret. Knauff v. Shaugnhessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542
(1950) (stating that admission to the United States is a privilege the government
grants to foreigners and, as such, is granted upon terms prescribed by the government).
155. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)
(quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)) (pro-
claiming that aliens who have entered the United States, even illegally, may only be
expelled after proceedings which comply with the due process of law). An alien, how-
ever, who has not yet entered the United States is granted only those procedures au-
thorized by Congress. Id.
156. Id.
157. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982).
158. See Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 309 n.5, reh'g denied, 400
U.S. 856 (1970) (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J.,
concurring)) ("Once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes
invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our bor-
ders. Such rights include those protected by the First and the Fifth Amendments and
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
159. See Hellenic Lines v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 310 (stating that resident aliens
are afforded the same constitutional due process protections as citizens); see also
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring) (asserting that
the Bill of Rights recognizes no differences between citizens and resident aliens).
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separation from family, friends, and occupation,160 such a person must
be given a fair opportunity to be heard and present evidence in his or
her defense. 1 ' As a result, resident aliens enjoy more procedural pro-
tections in deportation hearings than do aliens seeking intial entry.1
6 2
Because a deportation hearing is a civil proceeding, an alien is not
entitled to the due process protections which are found in criminal pro-
ceedings. 16 3 This interpretation is based on the view that deportation is
not punishment, but instead a refusal to harbor persons the United
States does not want within its borders."6 " Thus, resident aliens cannot
claim many constitutional safeguards, such as the right to a jury.160
160. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34 (relying on Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 503-04 (1977)) (stating that the right of a resident alien
to remain with his or her family ranks as one of the most important individual inter-
ests). See also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600, reh'g denied, 343 U.S.
936 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (comparing deportation to banishment and stating
that the liberty enjoyed by resident aliens is only illusory if the resident aliens are not
free from arbitrary banishment).
161. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 36. In Plasencia, the petitioner, a permanent resident
alien, travelled to Mexico for two days for the purpose of smuggling illegal aliens into
the United States. Id. at 23. Upon her return, the INS subjected her to an exclusion
hearing to determine whether her return constituted an "entry" for purposes of decid-
ing if her absence dissolved her resident alien status. Id. The Supreme Court held that
although the alien's entry is to be evaluated in an exclusion hearing, her status as a
resident alien entitles her to a fair hearing with procedures that afford her the opportu-
nity to make an effective presentation of her case. Id. at 36-37.
162. See id. at 26-27 (comparing the procedural rights guaranteed in a deportation
hearing with those allowed in an exclusion hearing). In an exclusion hearing, the alien:
does not enjoy the right to prior notice; carries the burden of proving eligibility for
entry; and may challenge exclusion only through a writ of habeus corpus. Id. In a
deportation proceeding, however, the alien is: entitled to a seven-day notice of the ac-
tion; the right of appeal to a federal circuit court; the right to seek suspension of a
deportation order; the option of departing voluntarily, and the burden of proof is on the
government, to prove an immigration violation with clear and convincing evidence. Id.
163. See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (stating that a
deportation proceeding is a purely civil action which looks prospectively to determine
the alien's right to remain in the country); see also The Transformation of Immigra-
tion Law, supra note 1, at 24-27 (questioning the deportation hearing's lack of proce-
dural protections normally found in criminal actions when significant personal interests
such as remaining with family, friends, and personal lifestyle are jeopardized).
164. See, e.g., Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) (stating that depor-
tation is not a punishment but instead the government's refusal to harbor unwanted
persons). But see Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600, reh g denied, 343 U.S
936 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that despite judicial recognition that de-
portation is a civil matter, its effects on the resident alien make it nothing less than
banishment).
165. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (observing
that because deportation is merely a means to return an alien to his own country, the
right to a jury trial, the prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures, and
cruel and unusual punishment are not binding in such hearings); see also Galvan v.
Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-32, reh'g denied, 348 U.S. 852 (1954) (holding that the pro-
hibition against ex post facto laws does not apply to deportations); Woodby v. INS, 385
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The availability of due process protections for deportation hearings
are determined by the Supreme Court's test adopted in Landon v.
Plasencia.6  The test requires courts to balance (1) the alien's interest
in remaining in the country; (2) the risk of erroneous deportation under
current procedures; (3) the value of additional procedural safeguards in
reducing that risk; and (4) the interest of the government in using cur-
rent procedures versus any additional procedural safeguards.
167
When considering terrorism, the interests of the alien and the gov-
ernment are both compelling. As the Supreme Court recognizes in
Plasencia, an alien's family, social, and economic ties create a signifi-
cant personal interest in avoiding deportation. 68 The Supreme Court
also recognizes the "weighty" interest of the government in efficient
enforcement of immigration laws.' 69 The government's interest is even
greater when it seeks to protect the public welfare10° from violent acts
by those who arbitrarily select their victims.' 7 ' Thus, further examina-
tion should focus on the 'protections afforded to classified information
versus the rights of aliens in immigration hearings.
U.S. 276, 284-86 (1966) (requiring that clear and convincing evidence serve as the
burden of proof in deportation cases).
Despite judicial recognition that deportation hearings are civil proceedings, Professor
Schuck notes that lower court decisions have assimilated several criminal due process
rights into these hearings. The Transformation of Immigration Law, supra note 1, at
66-68. He posits that this trend will probably continue as courts are more willing to
view deportation as a removal from one's community, instead of a mere loss of the
privilege to remain in the country. Id. at 66.
Nevertheless, Schuck questions whether imposing additional procedural requirements
would result in substantially more fairness to aliens. Id. at 67-68. Extending greater
procedural protections to the over one million deportations each year would require
enormous reallocation of INS resources and would result in a large backlog of cases.
Id. at 68. Schuck concludes that retaining the civil characterization of deportation
hearings may be a necessary compromise in light of empirical realities. Id. at 68.
166. 459 U.S. 21, 35 (1982). This test, first espoused in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976), calls for courts to "consider the interest at stake for the
individual, the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through procedures used as
well as the probable value of additional or different procedural safeguards, and the





170. Cf Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 358 (1956) (stating that some circumstances
may exist where the government is permitted to withhold classified information from an
alien, especially when national security is threatened).
171. See Sen. John Danforth, Remarks at the Jerusalem Conference on Interna-
tional Terrorism (July 2-5, 1979), in Terrorism Versus Democracy, INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE 116-17 (B. Netanyahu ed., 1981) (observing
that in selecting its victims, terrorism does not discriminate between combatants and
noncombatants, young and old, or male and female, so long as the number of casualties
and the magnitude of the violence are maximized).
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B. THE ROLE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN IMMIGRATION
HEARINGS
An alien seeking intial entry to the United States may be excluded
with no right to view the information the government uses to deny en-
try.1 72 In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, the government
attempted to exclude Mezei, a twenty-five-year resident alien from
New York, after his return from a two-year stay in Europe. 173 The
government refused to provide Mezei with a hearing pursuant to regu-
lations which allow the Attorney General to deny a hearing if the ex-
clusion is based on confidential information.17 4 After acknowledging
that a resident alien cannot be denied constitutional due process,17 5 the
Court found that Mezei's two year absence, nineteen months of which
were spent behind the Iron Curtain, dissolved his resident alien sta-
tus. 176 Because entering aliens can claim no rights of due process, the
Court found that the Attorney General could order the exclusion with-
out a hearing in order to protect the confidentiality of information used
against Mezei.' 7
172. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)
(stating that in an exclusion case, an Attorney General cannot be forced into disclosing
the foundation of his determinations).
173. Id. at 208. The alien, Mazei, proffered that he traveled to Rumania to visit his
dying mother. Id. When Rumania denied him entry, he spent nineteen months in Hun-
gary because of difficulties encountered in acquiring permission to leave. Id. After be-
ing denied entry to the United States, Mezei unsuccessfully sought to emigrate to other
countries. Id. at 209. Because no other country would receive him, Mezei was detained
on Ellis Island. Id. Thus, entry into the United States offered him the only means of
release from detention.
174. Id. at 210-11. The government relied on 8 C.F.R. § 175.57 which provides
that "[i]n any special case the alien may be denied a hearing before the board of
special inquiry ... if the Attorney General determines that he excludable ... on the
basis of information of a confidential nature, the disclosure of which would be prejudi-
cial to the public interest."
175. Id. at 213 (relying on Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590. 601
(1953)).
176. Id. at 214.
177. Id. at 214-15. Justices Black and Douglas pointed out that not only had Mezei
been excluded, but he had also faced an indefinite term of detention until another coun-
try agreed to receive him. Id. at 216-17 (Black, J. and Douglas, J., dissenting). They
also argued that the Court's holding puts the alien's liberty at the unreviewable and
arbitrary discretion of the government. Id.
Justices Jackson and Frankfurter, in a separate dissent, distinguished between the
substantive due process rights afforded to aliens, and the rights of procedural due pro-
cess. Id. at 218 (Jackson, J. and Frankfurter, J., dissenting). They agreed that the
executive may detain even a resident alien, especially when found necessary to preserve
the national security. Id. at 223. Procedural due process, however, demands that any
alien that comes within the jurisdiction of the United States be granted a fair hearing.
Id. at 228.
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The Supreme Court reached a different result, however, in a case in
which the person's absence from the United States did not destroy his
resident alien status. In Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,178 the govern-
ment relied on confidential information to exclude, without a hearing, a
five-year resident alien.1 79 Chew, who joined the United States
Merchant Marines in New York, was detained by immigration officials
when his ship docked in San Francisco.' 80 The Supreme Court found
that Chew's four month absence did not dissolve his resident alien sta-
tus, and therefore, he could not be excluded without a fair hearing.' 8'
The Court stated that not even Congress may deny a fair hearing to a
lawful permanent resident alien who has entered its jurisdiction and is
part of its population.'82
In Jay v. Boyd,18' the Supreme Court upheld the use of undisclosed,
confidential information to deny a waiver of a decision to deport a resi-
dent alien.' 4 After the Court found the alien deportable because of his
voluntary membership in the Communist Party, the alien filed an appli-
cation for suspension of the deportation order.18 5 The Court explained
that while the alien has a right to request discretionary relief, the
granting of such relief is a matter of grace.' 6 The gratuitous nature of
this relief, therefore, permits the use of confidential information with-
out requiring disclosure to the alien.187 According to the Court, the
constitutional protections afforded to resident aliens are useful only to
178. 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
179. Id. at 593-95.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 599. The Court ultimately found that the federal regulation permitting
the denial of a hearing in which confidential information is used, does not apply to
resident aliens. Id. The Court stated that "we find no language in the regulation that
would have required its application to the petitioner had he remained continuously and
physically within the United States." Id. Although the Chew decision is founded in
regulatory interpretation, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that Chew establishes
that resident aliens are entitled to a fair hearing as a matter of constitutional due
process. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
182. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, at 595.
183. 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
184. Id. at 347-50.
185. Id., see 8 C.F.R. § 242.17 (1991) (noting that under federal regulations,
which are still in place today, a resident alien who loses a deportation judgment may
file for discretionary relief from the Board of Immigration Appeals). In deciding
whether to suspend the deportation order, the immigration judge may consider confi-
dential information not in the record and not available for review by the alien. Id.
186. 351 U.S. at 345-55.
187. Id. at 359. The regulation in question restricts the use of confidential informa-
tion to those cases in which disclosure would endanger the public safety. Id. at 358.
According to the Court, "[i]f the statute permits any withholding of information from




interpret an ambiguous statute against the use of confidential
information.1 88
Plasencia, Mezei, and Chew provide that a resident alien facing de-
portation retains the right to a fair hearing. Because a deportation
hearing is a matter of right and not of grace, Boyd would appear to
compel the disclosure of classified government evidence to the alien.
The compelled disclosure of this evidence, however, is required only
when a "fair hearing" requires full disclosure of classified government
evidence. Recent legislation and court decisions, however, indicate that
such disclosure may not be necessary.
C. THE USE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AGAINST UNITED STATES
CITIZENS
The Supreme Court has held in no certain terms that resident aliens
enjoy the same rights of due process as do citizens."5 9 Therefore, an
examination of the judicial treatment of the use classified information
against citizens logically follows. Because a deportation hearing is a
civil proceeding, and because courts recognize a resident alien's signifi-
cant interest in avoiding expulsion from the United States, it is neces-
sary to examine the treatment of classified information in both criminal
and civil actions.
1. Classified Evidence in Criminal Actions
Generally, when the government's case against a United States citi-
zen is based upon classified information, the government must either
disclose such information to the defendant or abandon its pursuit of a
conviction.190 In Roviaro v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that the prosecution must disclose any information which may be rele-
vant and helpful to the defense.191 To refuse a defendant the opportu-
nity to examine the incriminating evidence, is considered a denial of
188. Id. at 359.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 154-64 (examining how the due process
rights of resident aliens are established by their interest in remaining within the United
States, but are limited by the characterization of a deportation hearing as a civil
proceeding).
190. See Note, Graymail: The Disclose or Dismiss Dilenma in Criminal Prosecu-
tions, 31 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 84, 86-95 (1980) (discussing the problems of using
classified information to support a criminal prosecution).
191. 353 U.S. 53, 60-62 (1957). The Court in Roviaro warned that no fixed rule
could be established. Id. at 62. Whether or not disclosure is required "must depend on
the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged,
the possible defense, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other
relevant factors." Id.
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the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation and right to a public
trial. 2
In the 1970s, however, Congress investigated instances in which the
reluctance of the government to disclose classified information forced
the voluntary dismissal of criminal prosecutions. 93 As a result of these
failed investigations, Congress enacted two laws which provide for the
use of in camera and ex parte review of classified information: the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),9 and the Classified Infor-
mation Procedures Act (CIPA). 1 5 Neither of these acts, however, pro-
poses, as did the Terrorist Alien Removal Act, to prevent the disclosure
of information material to the defense.
198
Congress enacted FISA in 1978 to establish procedures for the au-
thorization of electronic surveillance within the United States for for-
eign intelligence purposes.'97 The information obtained through the
surveillance may be used in a criminal proceeding only upon written
192. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him .... "
193. See SUBCOMM. ON SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE OF THE SENATE SELECT COMM.
ON INTELLIGENCE, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., NAT'L SECURITY SECRETS AND THE ADMIN.
OF JUSTICE 7-10 (Comm. Print 1978) (examining situations in which the government's
pursuit of a conviction requires the disclosure of information which may harm the na-
tional security). This "disclose or dismiss" dilemma can arise in a number of situations.
Id. In espionage and "leak" cases, the very information which gave rise to the breach
of security must often be revealed to the jury. Id. Such information does not lose its
sensitivity merely because of its disclosure by the defendant. Id. Often, adversary intel-
ligence organizations do not realize information is classified until the United States
litigates the matter. Id.
In many cases, the defendant is usually a high-ranking official who threatens to ex-
pose classified information to the public as part of the defense. Id. Such a situation
virtually immunizes the defendant from prosecution unless the government is willing to
risk the disclosure of the sensitive material. Id. In one case, the Justice Department
pursued drug trafficking charges against Pittaporn Khramkhruan, a CIA operative in
Thailand. Id. at 13-14. The government abandoned its prosecution after Khramkhruan
sought discovery of documents which would have revealed sources and methods of CIA
operations in Southeast Asia. Id.
In United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1120 (1977), defense counsel warned the Watergate Special Prosecutor that it
would seek to discover highly classified documents at trial. Id. at 930-32. Discovery was
avoided, however, because the court found the information, which consisted of strategic
nuclear targeting plans, irrelevant to the defense. Id. at 917-18.
194. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1988).
195. 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (1988).
196. See infra text accompanying notes 187-208 (examining applications of FISA
and CIPA).
197. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SUR-
VEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, S. REP. No. 701, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1978). Information
which constitutes "foreign intelligence" includes information relating to the ability of
the United States to protect against attack from a foreign power, sabotage, interna-
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authorization from the Attorney General.""8 If a defendant makes a
motion to suppress the evidence obtained through an electronic surveil-
lance, the government is permitted to protect the underlying classified
information by requesting a judge to review the FISA order in camera
and ex parte.199 Lower courts have upheld the constitutionality of these
procedures, reasoning that the right to be present at all proceedings
and the right to a public trial does not apply to pretrial suppression
hearings. 00 When, however, an adversary hearing is necessary to deter-
mine the legality of a surveillance, the courts may compel disclosure to
the defendant.201
Unlike FISA, the Classified Information Procedures Act provides for
the use of in camera, ex parte review of classified information to be
used at trial.202 Congress enacted CIPA to allow the government to
evaluate classified information in the defendant's possession in order to
determine whether to dismiss the action, or risk the defendant's public
disclosure of the sensitive information at trial.20 3 Contrary to its in-
tional terrorism, clandestine intelligence activities, and any matter relating to the na-
tional defense or conduct of foreign affairs. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e).
198. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(b). Courts require that although this information may be
used in criminal proceedings, the primary purpose of electronic surveillance should be
for foreign intelligence purposes. See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77 (2d
Cir. 1984) (stating that the language of the act and its requirements for authorizing
electronic surveillances make plain that its primary purpose must be to gather foreign
intelligence data). But see United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1313-14
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (permitting the use of information obtained despite the fact that the
primary motivation of the surveillance was to amass evidence for a criminal
conviction).
199. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(0. Before a court can make an in camera, ex parte review
of a FISA application and order, the Attorney General must file an affidavit certifying
that the disclosure of such material in an adversary setting is harmful to national se-
curity. Id.
200. See, e.g., United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1315-16 (holding that the
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation and right to a public trial do not apply to a
motion to suppress FISA information). The court in Falvey noted that in camera, ex
parte hearings are used to determine the reliability of informants. Id. at 1315.
201. See United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1193-94 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(distinguishing Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, which held that disclosure to
a defendant is required to determine whether seized evidence is tainted), affd mem.,
729 F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1983). Section 1806(0 provides that in determining the legality
of a FISA order "the court may disclose to the aggrieved person, under appropriate
security procedures and protective orders, portions of the application, order, or other
materials relating to the surveillance only where such disclosure is necessary to make
an accurate determination of legality of the surveillance."
50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (emphasis added).
202. See Richard P. Salgado, Comment, Government Secrets. Fair Trials, and the
Classified Information Procedures Act, 98 YALE L.J. 427, 427-31 (1988) (examining
the history and purpose of CIPA).
203. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PROCE-
DURES ACT, S. REP. No. 823, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1980) [hereinafter SENATE
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tended purpose, however, CIPA has been employed to allow in camera,
ex parte use of classified information against the defendant.
20 4
Under CIPA, if a defendant seeks the discovery of classified docu-
ments, the Attorney General may request an ex parte and in camera
hearing after certifying that disclosure of such information would dam-
age national security.2"5 Like the Terrorist Alien Removal Act, CIPA
authorizes a court to substitute disclosure of the classified material with
a summary of the information. 0 6 If the government ultimately refuses
to disclose the information to the defendant, the court may order the
prosecution to continue if the "interests of justice" would not be served
by a dismissal.
20 7
Use of CIPA is generally limited to preventing the disclosure of clas-
sified information immaterial to determining the defendant's guilt or
innocence.20 In United States v. Porter, the government used CIPA to
CIPA REPORT]. Congress intended for CIPA to require the defense to notify the court,
prior to trial, of all motions it intended to make which requires the discovery of classi-
fied documents. Id. at 2. This practice allows the government to determine whether it
should continue with the prosecution, as well as protecting sensitive information imma-
terial to the defense. Id. at 1. Nowhere in the legislative history does Congress imply
that the government may successfully prosecute a case without disclosing material evi-
dence to the defendant.
204. See United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965-66 (9th Cir. 1988) (up-
holding ex parte, in camera review of classified material by the district court).
205. 18 U.S.C. app. § 6(c)(2) (1988). Section 6(c)(2) provides:
The United States may . . . submit to the court an affidavit of the Attorney
General certifying that disclosure of classified information would cause identifi-
able damage to the national security of the United States and explaining the
basis for the classification of such information. If so requested by the United
States, the court shall examine such affidavit in camera and ex parte.
18 U.S.C. app. § 6(c)(2) (1988).
206. 18 U.S.C. app. § 6(c)(1). Section 6(c)(1) provides in part:
[T]he United States may move that, in lieu of the disclosure of such specific
classified information, the court order-
(A) the substitution for such classified information of a statement admitting
relevant facts that the specific classified information would tend to prove; or
(B) the substitution for such classified information of a summary of the spe-
cific classified information.
18 U.S.C. app. § 6(c)(1).
207. 18 U.S.C. app. § 6(e)(2). 18 U.S.C. app. § 6(e)(2) provides:
[Wjhen the court determines that the interests of justice would not be served by
dismissal of the indictment, the court shall order such other action, in lieu of
dismissing the indictment or information, as the court determines is appropriate.
Such action may include, but need not be limited to-
(A) dismissing specified counts of the indictment or information;
(B) finding against the United States on any issue as to which the excluded
classified information relates; or
(C) striking or precluding all or part of the testimony of a witness.
18 U.S.C. app. § 6(e)(2) (emphasis added).
208. See United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 427-28 (1st Cir. 1984) (using
CIPA to deny discovery of radio transmitters used to apprehend defendants); United
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deny the defense team's inspection of aircraft surveillance equipment
used to apprehend the defendants. 2 9 After examining the equipment in
camera and ex parte, the Sixth Circuit held that although denying the
inspection may have hampered the defense, the defense was not de-
prived of a fair trial.210 The court also noted that in light of other avail-
able evidence, examination of the equipment offered little to the
defense.21'
In United States v. Sarkissian,1 2 however, the Ninth Circuit used
CIPA to deny defendants access to information submitted to the court
by request of the government.213 The FBI accused the defendants,
members of the Justice Commandoes of the Armenian Genocide, of
attempting to destroy the Honorary Turkish Consulate in Philadel-
phia. 214 At trial, the government submitted classified information which
the court sealed from disclosure to the defendants. 1 5 Without attempt-
ing to characterize the nature of the information and without determin-
ing its relevance to the defense, the court of appeals interpreted CIPA
to bar the defendants' access to the information.1 ' The court, however,
merely stressed the classified nature of the information and ignored the
Congressional intent that CIPA is not to be used in any manner that
would prejudice the defendant. 1
States v. Panas, 738 F.2d 278, 285-86 (8th Cir. 1984) (refusing discovery of radio
transmitters when the capabilities of such radios are corroborated by expert testimony);
United States v. Porter, 701 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007
(1983) (refusing inspection of radar equipment after determining that the inspection
contributes little to the defense).
209. 701 F.2d at 1162. Customs officials employed radar systems which are used in
military fighter aircraft to track the defendant's plane carrying contraband into the
United States. Id. at 1160. The government denied requests to inspect the equipment
under section 4 of CIPA which authorizes a court, in camera and ex parte, to delete
specific immaterial facts from the classified information that is to be made available to
the defendants. Id. at 1162.
210. Id. at 1162-63.
211. Id. at 1162. At trial, the government introduced expert testimony describing,
in detail, the range and capabilities of the radar equipment. Id. A similar holding was
reached in United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1984). In this case, a Mas-
sachusetts district court refused to allow discovery of certain radio transmitters used by
federal agents in a narcotics sting operation. Id. at 426. The Court of Appeals held the
transmitters not discoverable under CIPA after an in camera, ex parte hearing. Id. at
427-28. The court ruled that the sought-for evidence had no bearing on the guilt or
innocence of the defendants and would not have aided the defense. Id.
212. 841 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1988).
213. Id. at 965-66 (emphasis added).
214. Id. at 961-962.
215. Id. at 962.
216. Id. at 965.
217. Id. In denying the defendants access to the information, the court appears to
have balanced the defendant's need for the information with the national security inter-
ests sought to be protected by refusing disclosure. Id. The defendants argued that
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Thus, although FISA and CIPA regulate the use of in camera and
ex parte review of classified information, they do so only to prevent
disclosure of information immaterial to the defense. The Terrorist
Alien Removal Act, however, would have permitted the ex parte use of
secret evidence that forms the foundation of the government's case
against a resident alien.21 Unlike CIPA, if even a summary of the
classified material would harm national security, the Terrorist Alien
Removal Act would not have required disclosure of the information or
dismissal of the deportation hearing.219
2. Classified Evidence in Civil Actions
Although each citizen's interest in a fair adjudication trumps the
government's use of classified information in a criminal trial, the gov-
ernment's veil of secrecy resists penetration in civil actions. A civil
plaintiff may be forced to surrender the pursuit of a remedy if resolu-
tion of the matter requires discovery of classified information. 2
In Totten v. United States,221 a decedent's administrator sought com-
pensation for services the decedent performed as a spy for Union forces
during the American Civil War.222 Without discovery of the specific
terms of the contract between the decedent and the President, the suffi-
ciency of the government's offered compensation could not be verified
by the administrator. 223 The Supreme Court refused to compel discov-
CIPA forbid such balancing, implying that CIPA must either exclude irrelevant infor-
mation or demand disclosure of information material to the defense. Id. The Circuit
Court ruled the argument meritless, citing a section of the Senate CIPA report which
states that courts should consider the possible harm to national security in allowing
discovery. Id.
The legislative history relied upon by the court, however, deals with that part of
CIPA which allows the government to delete irrelevant items from classified documents
while substituting "a statement admitting the facts that classified information might
prove." SENATE CIPA REPORT, supra note 202, at 6 (emphasis added). Three pages
later, the same report states that when the government refuses to disclose classified
information, "the court must then issue an order that is designed to ensure that the
defendant's ability to prepare for his defense is not impaired . . . ." Id. at 9. The report
then declares: "It should be emphasized . . . that the court should not balance the
national security interests of the Government against the rights of the defendant to
obtain the information." Id. (emphasis added).
218. S. 635. 102d Cong., Ist Sess. § 501(b) (1991).
219. Id. at § 501(e)(1).
220. See infra text accompanying notes 221-237 (examining the use of classified
information in civil actions).
221. 91 U.S. 105 (1875).
222. Id. at 105-106. The decedent entered into a contract with President Lincoln,
promising to infiltrate the South to determine the size and location of Confederate
forces and fortifications. Id.
223. Id. at 106.
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ery, noting that if the disclosure of secret documents could be forced
through the bringing of a civil claim, then the security of the public
would be sacrificed.224 Therefore, public policy demands that the pur-
suit of a remedy must fail when such action may result in the revela-
tion of state secrets.225
In United States v. Reynolds,226 the Supreme Court denied the
plaintiff's discovery request for the production of classified documents
in a tort action. 22 7 The plaintiffs, widows of three technical experts
killed while conducting a top-secret test of air-defense equipment,
sought discovery of an Air Force accident investigation report. 28 In
denying discovery, the Court held the classified report privileged under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.229
The Court likened the government's claim of privilege to the right
against self incrimination. 230 The presiding judge must be satisfied by
the context in which the claim of privilege is made that the asserted
claim prevents the harmful effects that could result from disclosure.231
The Supreme Court warned that a judge should not compromise the
security of state secrets by insisting upon examination of the evidence,
even if such an examination is in camera.
232
224. Id. at 106-107.
225. Id. at 107.
226. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
227. Id. at 11.
228. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiffs sought discovery of the Air Force accident report through
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which Congress made applicable in
suits against the United States government through the Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2674. Id. at 4. Rule 34 then provided that a court may:
order any party to produce and permit the inspection, copying or photographing,
by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence relating to any of the matters permitted within the
scope of the examination..
Id. at 3 n.3.
229. Id. at 9-11.
230. Id. at 8-9.
231. Id. at 14-15. The court acknowledged that "[t]oo much judicial inquiry into a
claim of privilege would force disclosure of the thing the privilege was meant to pro-
tect, while a complete abandonment of judicial control would lead to intolerable
abuses." Id. Thus, the Court recognized that requiring disclosure in all circumstances
would render useless the classification of government documents. However, honoring
the claim of privilege on its mere assertion allows the government to frustrate virtually
all civil actions in which the plaintiff seeks discovery of government documents. Id.
232. Id. at 10. The court rejected the plaintiffs' reliance on criminal cases which
force the government to either disclose the classified data, or dismiss its prosecution of
the accused. Id. at 12. Such cases, according to the Court, do not apply to civil actions
since the government is not the moving party seeking the sole benefit of classified infor-
mation. Id.
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In Halkins v. Helms,233 the Court of Appeals for the Circuit Court
of the District of Columbia reviewed a discovery request in a suit by
twenty-seven individuals alleging that the federal government illegally
intercepted international wire, cable, and telephone communications.234
The plaintiffs sought discovery of the names of individuals and organi-
zations whose communications were intercepted by the National Secur-
ity Agency. 235 The court of appeals rejected plaintiffs' request to be
present during the lower court's in camera review of classified informa-
tion. 236 The court held that state secrets are absolute and courts cannot
risk the possibility that an individual litigant might divulge the infor-
mation gleaned from an in camera hearing.2 37 The court also stated
that executive claims of privilege should be granted the "utmost defer-
ence" when made to protect military or diplomatic secrets.2 38
Totten, Reynolds, and Halkins aids interpretation of the Terrorist
Alien Removal Act only if one views deportation as a civil proceeding
by which the resident alien seeks the prospective "privilege" of remain-
ing within the United States. Such reasoning, however, ignores the in-
creasing willingness of courts to recognize deportation as a separation
of the alien from significant personal interests which deserve constitu-
tional protection. 39 Also, in a deportation hearing, the government is
the party moving to introduce the secret evidence. 241 In Totten, Reyn-
olds, and Halkins, the plaintiffs moved to discover classified informa-
tion with the speculative hope that the material would assist their case.
233. 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
234. Id. at 3.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 7.
237. Id. Likewise, allowing a "suspected terrorist" to be present at an in camera
review of classified information is illogical. The Classified Information Procedures Act
provides that a court may permit a defendant to view classified information under an
order that prohibits disclosure of such information. 18 U.S.C. app. § 3 (1988). These
protective orders are futile when used against an alien who is to be deported outside the
jurisdiction of the United States.
238. Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (relying on United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)). The court stated:
[a] ranking of the various privileges recognized in our courts would be a delicate
undertaking at best, but it is quite clear that the privilege to protect state secrets
must head the list. The state secrets privilege is absolute. However helpful to the
court the informed advocacy of the plaintiff's counsel may be, we must be espe-
cially careful not to order any dissemination of information asserted to be privi-
leged state secrets.
Id. at 7.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 154-64 (discussing the Supreme Court's
examination of a resident alien's interests that are at stake in a deportation hearing).
240. See supra text accompanying note 161 (noting that the burden is on the gov-
ernment to prove an immigration violation with clear and convincing evidence).
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Thus, in both criminal and civil cases, the government may not benefit
from information that it brings into court without disclosing that same
information to the defendant. As Justice Vinson recognized in United
States v. Reynolds,241 allowing the moving party to seek prosecution
with the aid of secret evidence, while depriving the responding party
access to that same material is unconscionable.
24 2
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE LEGISLATION
Although a continuing need for an effective counterterrorism pro-
gram exists, experts agree that such strategies must respect the rights
of individuals.243 Terrorism not only attempts to disrupt the functions
of government, but also seeks to win the sympathies of the people by
provoking oppressive government responses.24 Thus, the zealous appli-
cation of security defenses against terrorism must also recognize that
preserving the political freedoms of individuals is, inherently, a vital
weapon in the war against terrorism.
Likewise, any legislation to facilitate the deportation of resident
aliens as suspected terrorists must not abandon the procedural protec-
tions previously afforded to resident aliens. The following suggestions
are intended to produce a Terrorist Alien Removal Act that is both
acceptable to Congress, and true to the fundamental notions of fairness
that preserve democracy.
A. REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL INFORMATION
The treatment of classified information in civil and criminal actions
is difficult to reconcile with deportation hearings in a way that is both
legally consistent and practically humane. Because a deportation hear-
241. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
242. Id. at 12.
243. Senator Danforth, Remarks at the Jerusalem Conference on Terrorism (July
2-5, 1979), in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE 115-116 (B.
Netanyahu ed., 1981). Senator Danforth argues that unlike totalitarian regimes, demo-
cratic governments do not operate with unchecked power to suppress threats to domes-
tic order. Id. at 116. Instead, respect for the rights of individuals limits the tools availa-
ble to respond to terrorist actions within a democracy. Id.
244. See id. at 120-21 (arguing that terrorist causes will not win support so long as
governments preserve the people's right to participate in the political process). See also
Yonah Alexander, Remarks at the Symposium on the Legal Aspects of Terrorism,
Washington, D.C. (Nov. 7, 1988), in Legal Aspects of Terrorism, 12 TERRORISlM 297,
298 (1989) (stating that "should governments overreact to terrorism and meet it with
. . . repression, democracy itself will be substantially weakened. The terrorists will
then achieve one of their primary goals: the destruction of democratic society").
245. See supra text accompanying notes 242-43 (discussing the need to avoid op-
pressive government reactions in combatting terrorism).
19921
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
ing is a civil proceeding,246 a resident alien cannot compel the disclos-
ure of classified information. After all, the Supreme Court has held
that the deportation hearing is not punishment, but merely serves to
determine whether an alien is entitled to the privilege of remaining in
the United States.247
In Landon v. Plasencia,24 8 however, the Supreme Court found that
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause requires that a resident alien
facing deportation must be given an opportunity to make an effective
presentation. 49 Concealing information from an alien which the gov-
ernment finds effective in arguing for deportation, deprives the alien of
the ability to effectively defend against such action.
In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, Justice Jackson rec-
ognized that both the alien and the government have an interest in re-
stricting the use of secret proceedings.250 Shutting the public out of
deportation tribunals opens the door for corruption, and paves the way
for popular discontent. An incident in England, in which six Irishmen
were convicted of bombing a pub were released after spending sixteen
years in prison provides a vivid example of this danger. 51 A British
appellate court found that the police not only forced the defendants to
sign confessions, but also tampered with evidence in order to obtain
their convictions.252
Efforts to curb the use of ex parte deportation hearings, however,
must begin with a refinement of the definition of terrorism. Much of
the fear of the in camera, ex parte hearings could be reduced by nar-
rowing the pool of resident aliens who could be subjected to such hear-
ings. The definition of "terrorist activity" should be recalibrated to wel-
come the political expression of aliens, while at the same time
defending against those who articulate their beliefs through violence.
The effort to limit the use of deportation hearings first requires
prohibiting the deportation of any alien who merely negligently partici-
246. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984).
247. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text (finding that deportation hear-
ings are civil proceedings and, therefore, aliens are not entitled to the same due process
protections as afforded in criminal proceedings).
248. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
249. Id. at 36.
250. See 345 U.S. at 224-25 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (stating: "[ljet it not be over-
looked that due process of law is not for the sole benefit of the accused. It is the best
insurance for the Government itself against those blunders which leave lasting stains on
a system of justice but which are bound to occur on ex parte consideration").
251. See John McCoy, The Wheels of Justice, TIME, Mar. 25, 1991, at 45 (discuss-




pates in terrorist activity. 253 Legislating what resident aliens "should
know" about a form of violence that experts cannot define, and which
is subject to the political whims of the State Department, is uncon-
scionable.254 Furthermore, deporting aliens who harbor no intent to
harm the United States or its people does not advance national security
interests.
When an alien is accused of knowingly contributing to an act of ter-
rorism, the Terrorist Alien Removal Act should require the disclosure
of any classified information material to the alien's defense. Thus, pro-
cedures similar to CIPA should be employed.255 Accordingly, the un-
necessary disclosure of classified evidence would be prevented while al-
lowing the alien to effectively challenge the truth of the government's
accusations.
Forbidding the undisclosed use of classified information in all cir-
cumstances, however, gives aid to those who infiltrate the United States
for the sole purpose of terrorizing the "domestic tranquility." 501 The
use of secret evidence should be allowed when the alien's interests are
not seriously impinged upon, and a national security threat is
imminent.
2 57
The Supreme Court recognized that an alien's interest in avoiding
deportation are not necessarily fixed. 25 8 These interests develop as time
strengthens the alien's ties to the community.259 Thus, courts should
employ the balancing test adopted in Landon v. Plasencia in measuring
the adequacy of the government's disclosure.26 0 Such a balancing test
would allow the terrorist removal judge to weigh the interests of the
alien in avoiding deportation against the government's need for secrecy.
253. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601(a)(3)(B)(iii), 104
Stat. 4978, 5070 (1990) (authorizing the deportation of any alien who assists any indi-
vidual or organization that has committed a terrorist act whom the alien knows, or
reasonably should know); see also Bruce Fein, Improving on a Terrorist Idea, Tx.
LAWYER, July 1, 1991, at 17 (recommending that negligence should not trigger the
jurisdiction of the special deportation tribunal).
254. See supra text accompanying notes 101-15 (examining the problems of defin-
ing terrorism).
255. See supra text accompanying notes 201-16 (examining applications of the
Classified Information Procedures Act).
256. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
257. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that the First
Amendment does not protect speech likely to incite imminent and likely unlawful
action).
258. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (stating that "once an alien
gains admission to [the United States] and begins to develop ties that go with perma-
nent residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly").
259. Id.
260. Id. at 35-36.
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Terrorists would also be prevented from claiming the protections of
constitutional due process at the very instant they cross the border into
the United States.
B. REINFORCE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Any proposal to permit the ex parte use of classified evidence de-
mands complete judicial independence from INS authority. Under the
proposed Terrorist Alien Removal Act, Article III judges appointed by
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court would preside over all special
removal hearings.26' This represents a significant and welcome depar-
ture from traditional immigration procedures. 62
Presently, INS administrative judges subject to the influence of the
INS political leadership preside over deportation hearings. 2 3 Like the
FISA court, judges appointed to the special terrorist deportation court
should serve for no longer than one term.264 The proposed Terrorist
Alien Removal Act which called for the reappointment of judges cre-
ates a personal interest in handing down decisions favorable to the
government.
Additionally, the term should be lengthened from the proposed five-
year term, to ten years.26 A ten-year term would foster expertise in
handling classified information and prevent a multitude of judges from
having access to state secrets.2 66
CONCLUSION
It is to the credit of the FBI and the INS that no article need be
written about the failure of the United States to defend against domes-
tic terrorist strikes. Any analysis of counterterrorism strategy must be
measured against the reality that international terrorist groups
threaten, plan, and execute acts of violence against American civilians.
261. S. 635, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 503(a) (1991).
262. See The Transformation of Immigration Law, supra note 1 at 30-34 (criticiz-
ing the fact that those who adjudicate immigration violations work for the same admin-
istrative employers as those who investigate the violations).
263. Id. at 31.
264. See United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 791-92 (9th Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing that the limited term served by specially appointed FISA judges does not hamper
their judicial independence); see also United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180,
1197 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aft'd, 729 F.2d 1444 (1983) (ruling that the finite terms of
FISA judges does not render their judicial independence constitutionally suspect be-
cause they are district court judges appointed for life by the President).
265. See Bruce Fein, Improving on a Terrorist Idea, Tx. LAWYER, July 1, 1991, at
17 (recommending a ten-year term for special removal judges in order to foster exper-




United States democracy, however, has long believed that the ends do
not justify every available means.
267
In seeking to ensure the security of the American people, United
States counterterrorism policy must not confuse terrorism with political
activism. The United States must not demand that a foreign-born per-
son should not be heard from upon entering the country. Thus, who the
United States labels as a terrorist must reflect the source of our fears
- physical violence. The ability of an agency or President to exploit
this fear in order to silence and remove those who disagree with United
States foreign policy cannot be tolerated.
The collection of classified information provides the government with
a powerful weapon against those who carry out acts of violence. To
forbid the use of classified information in deportation proceedings
shackles the hands of those we look to for protection. In a courtroom,
however, the use of secret evidence obstructs the search for truth. If
terrorism is physical violence motivated by political concerns, classified
information must be used only against terrorism's virulence, and not
against those who merely voice their concerns.
267. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233-34 (1944), reh g denied,
324 U.S. 885 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (stating, in his dissent, that, when mat-
ters relating to the prosecution and progress of war are involved, the United States
must give great weight to the military authorities). Justice Murphy also suggests that
the authorities must be given broad discretion to deal with such matters. Id. at 233-34.
Justice Murphy emphasizes, however, that this military discretion must be limited to
the extent that it impinges on the constitutional rights of the individuals involved. Id.
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